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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:*
BLIND JUSTICE IN "CORRECTIVE
MEASURES" LITIGATION
Lisa Maria Tanzi**
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")'T has been the
subject of intense and complicated litigation since its enactment in
1990.2 In passing the ADA, ten years ago, Congress found that
"some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities."3 With this number increasing, Congress sought to
protect the millions of "people with disabilities [who] want to work
but cannot find a job" from employment discrimination.4 To
accomplish this goal, Congress enabled those with certain disabili-
ties to sue when faced with discrimination in their place of
* 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 2001; B.A., Binghamton University, 1998.
The author wishes to thank her parents and her sister for their unconditional love
and support.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
2 Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 107 (1998). Between 1992 and July
1998, there were 615 ADA trial court cases. Id. Of those 615 cases, the
defendant employer prevailed in 570 cases, or 92.7%. Id. at 109. On appeal, the
defendant employers prevailed in 448 of the 475 appealed cases, or at a rate of
94%. Id. Thus litigation has produced frustrating results for plaintiffs, as they
have had little success under the ADA. Erwin Chemerinsky, Unfulfilled Promise:
The Americans with Disabilities Act, TRIAL, Sept. 1999, at 88, 90. The Supreme
Court's decisions in June of 1999 will "significantly curtail the reach of the ADA
and that will make successful litigation under the [Aict even more difficult." Id.
at 88.
' 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
4 AMERICANS wrrH DisABLTmEs ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9
(citing to the staggering levels of unemployment among the disabled).
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employment or when seeking a job. The ADA requires the judge
to consider individually the impairment of each plaintiff to
determine whether that person is afflicted with a disability that
warrants ADA protection.5 Because the statute requires an individ-
ualized analysis of a plaintiff's disability, it has been difficult for
the courts to decide which disabilities fall under the umbrella of
protection of the ADA.6 This problem has been exacerbated by
technological advances in medicine and the resulting ability to
provide the means to "control" impairments.7
In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., the Supreme Court recently
concluded that an individual's impairment should be evaluated in
the medicated or "controlled" state rather than in the natural state
because "those whose impairments are largely corrected by
medication or other devices are not 'disabled' within the meaning
of the ADA.",8 This holding will have ramifications that will
' 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994). Disabilities must be evaluated "with respect to
an individual" and be determined by whether an impairment substantially limits
the "major life activities of such individual." Id. § 12102(2). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has defined "major life
activities" to include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999). The Supreme Court also found reproduction to be a
major life activity. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998). "The
determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based
on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the
effect of that impairment on the life of the individual." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630
(1999) (interpreting "substantially limits" in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)).
6 Compare Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 n.10 (1st
Cir. 1998) (holding that the unmitigated state is determinative for deciding
whether an individual with diabetes mellitus is disabled) with Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1998), affid, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999)
(holding that disabilities, namely myopia, should be considered in their mitigated
states) and Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464
(1998) (holding that only serious impairments, such as diabetes, epilepsy and
Adult Stills Disease, will be considered in their unmitigated state).
7 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148. A main issue before the courts is whether a
person is still disabled if they use a modem medication to control their
impairment. For instance, Sutton dealt with a person who could see perfectly
with glasses but without glasses was legally blind. Id.
8 id.
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reverberate throughout the federal courts across the country.9 The
courts now must determine whether medication or devices that
individuals are using are corrective measures and thus, disqualify
them from protection under the ADA.10 As a result of the Sutton
ruling, the lower courts will have a difficult time considering
claims under the ADA by individuals with impairments that are not
corrected but, instead, merely maintained, such as cancer, epilepsy
and diabetes." Moreover, the Court's narrow interpretation has
limited the success that plaintiffs may achieve under the ADA.
9 David Sinclair, Local Attorneys React to High Court's ADA Decisions, 9
LAW. J., July 30, 1999, at 3 ("the [C]ourt's decision to keep the number of
disabled close to the 43 million mark ... will absolutely generate further
litigation"). See, e.g., Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897 (8th Cir.
1999) (finding that a police officer who received medicine and counseling for his
depression is not substantially limited). See also EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co.,
181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding individuals are not disabled because they
are not substantially limited when treating impairments with mitigating
measures); Whitney v. Apfel, No. C-98-1119, 1999 WL 786369, at * 1 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 1999) (finding that medication used to treat depression is a mitigating
measure).
'0 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2139. The Court failed to define corrective measure.
Instead, the Court merely stated that "use of a corrective device does not, by
itself, relieve one's disability." Id. at 2149. "Rather one has a disability under
subsection A if, notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, that individual
is substantially limited in a major life activity." Id. The ADA lists three separate
definitions of disability upon which an individual can bring an ADA claim. 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994). Subsection A states that the term disability
means "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual." Id. § 12102(2)(A) [hereinafter
Subsection A]. Subsection B states that the term disability means that there is "a
record of such an impairment" by an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor management committee. Id. § 12102(2)(B)
[hereinafter Subsection B]. Subsection C states that the term disability means that
the individual has been "regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
§ 12102(2)(C) [hereinafter Subsection C]. See also Sinclair, supra note 9, at 15
("there will be more litigation as to the disabilities and mitigating conditions that
might or might not be covered").
" Workers with 'Correctable' Handicaps Not Protected Under ADA, Says
Supreme Court, ANDREwS AIDS L1TIG. REP., July 12, 1999, at 3, 4 [hereinafter
Workers] (arguing that employers may be able to discriminate against individuals
that have epilepsy or diabetes as a result of the Supreme Court's opinions
defining disability).
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The ruling in Sutton has limited greatly the classes of persons
protected from discrimination under the ADA. Individuals now
must demonstrate that they remain substantially limited in a major
life activity even while utilizing measures to mitigate their
disability. 12 It is virtually impossible for most disabled people to
meet such a high threshold because, as a result of medicine and
technology, most are not substantially limited in a major life
activity. Nonetheless, under the Court's ruling, such individuals still
may be discriminated against in the workplace on the basis of this
disability.
This Note examines the extent to which mitigating measures
should affect a disabled person's right to sue under the ADA. The
Supreme Court failed to provide any substantive guidance in Sutton
to aid the federal courts in identifying which medications or
12 Workers, supra note 11, at 4 (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in
the corrective measures litigation). The Supreme Court's requirement, that in
order for a person to be considered disabled when utilizing corrective measures
that person be substantially limited in a major life activity with the corrective
measure, is too high of a threshold for most disabled people to meet. John M.
Husband, Corrective Measures in the Determination of Disability Under the
ADA, 28 CoLo. LAW. 5 (1999). This is evident in a number of lower court
decisions that were issued following the Supreme Court's analysis of disability
under the ADA in Sutton. See, e.g., Spades v. Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897 (8th
Cir. 1999) (finding that because the officer's depression was corrected by
medication he was not substantially limited in a major life activity); EEOC v.
R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that treatment of his
cancer with chemotherapy treatments did not substantially limit the plaintiff in
a major life activity); Matlock v. City of Dallas, No. Civ. A. 3:97-CV-2735,
1999 WL 1032601 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999) (holding that with the
assistance of a hearing aid, plaintiff suffered little or no hearing loss in each ear
and thus could not be considered substantially limited in the major life activity
of hearing); Whitney v. Apfel, No. C-98-1119, 1999 WL 786369, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 28, 1999) (finding that because the plaintiff used medication to treat
his depression he was not substantially limited in a major life activity); Haiman
v. Village of Fox Lake, 55 F. Supp. 2d 886 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that
because the plaintiff's medication alleviated the symptoms of her impairment she
was not disabled under the ADA); Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 604 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (deciding that because the plaintiff's impairment
of sleep apnea had been corrected with the use of an air pressure machine he
was not substantially limited in any major life activity).
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treatments disqualify plaintiffs as disabled under the ADA.'3 The
question, thus, remains whether all medications prescribed to
plaintiffs to alleviate impairments are now considered mitigating
measures. Part I of this Note presents the applicable portions of the
ADA and the Supreme Court cases analyzing corrective measures,
and demonstrates that the Court's decisions conflict with the intent
of the ADA. Part II of this Note discusses the manner in which the
Court's decisions have been applied as a "blanket exclusion" to
ADA protection in the lower courts. Part III proposes a balancing
approach to determine how severely an individual is affected by a
disability that remains faithful to both the Supreme Court's
definition of disability and the intent of the ADA. Part 1II then
applies the balancing approach to the recent Supreme Court cases,
demonstrating that balancing the interests of the parties involved,
rather than applying a bright-line test, most fairly will serve people
with disabilities and at the same time protect the interests of
employers. This Note concludes that if the Court had adopted a
balancing approach to determine whether mitigating measures no
longer leave a claimant disabled under the ADA, it would have
reached different results in its recent trilogy of cases and provided
clearer guidance for the lower courts. This guidance would have
provided needed protections for individuals who are disabled rather
than forcing them to go through the more difficult task of demon-
strating that their employers regarded them as disabled.14
"3 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. "A person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the
impairment is corrected it does not 'substantially limi[t]' a major life activity."
Id.
14 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE
ADA 254 (1998). When disability cases are brought before the courts, many
courts find no disability of substantial limitation under Subsection A and have
then applied that finding to the analysis under Subsection C, whether the
employer regards the individual as substantially limited. Id.
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I. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in
1990 5 to provide broad based anti-discrimination protection for
individuals with disabilities.16 The Act provides that "[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions and privileges of employment."'17 Disability is
defined as "(a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (b)
a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having
such an impairment."'8 Substantially limiting is defined by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the agency
charged by Congress with the Act's enforcement and interpretation,
as a disability that causes an individual to be "unable to perform
a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform" or that "significantly restrict[s]" the
performance of that major life activity.'9 Major life activities
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). Congress found that "unlike individuals
who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the
basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimina-
tion." Id. § 12101(a)(4)."The Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals." Id. § 12101(a)(8).
Thus, this Act ensures that "the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established ... on behalf of individuals with disabilities."
Id. § 12101(b)(3).
,7 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
18 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A-C) (1994).
19 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i-ii) (1999) (defining the term "substantially
limits"). 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). The EEOC has the authority to issue
regulations to carry out the employment provisions. "Not later than one year after
[the date of enactment of this Act], the Commission shall issue regulations in an
accessible format to carry out this subchapter." See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1
(1999) (citing the purpose of this regulation is to implement Title I of the ADA).
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include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working."'2
Additionally, such activities may include reading, thinking,
concentrating, interacting with others,21 sitting, standing, lifting,
reaching and reproduction.22 The Supreme Court defined "major
life activity" in regard to the ADA as an activity that "denotes
comparative importance" and the Court suggested "that the
touchstone for determining an activity's inclusion under the
statutory rubric is its significance.
23
In order to be substantially limited in the major life activity of
"working," the EEOC requires that the individual be precluded
from "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes."'24 An individual is excluded from a broad range of jobs
if the individual cannot meet the requirements of a number and
type of jobs in a geographical area that do not utilize "similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities."'25 Thus, an individual is
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, and
excluded from a class of jobs, if the individual is afflicted with a
back condition that prevents the individual from performing any
heavy labor.26 An individual is also excluded from a broad class
of jobs and substantially limited if the individual has an allergy to
a substance present in high rise office buildings, which excludes
20 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999).
21 EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Americans with Disabilities Act and
Psychiatric Disabilities at 8 (Mar. 25, 1997), in UNITED STATES EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(1998) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance].
2 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1999). The appendix provides an interpretation of
the enforcement guidelines listing examples of what may be considered a major
life activity. See also Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). In Bragdon, the
Supreme Court accepted the EEOC's reference to reproduction as a major life
activity. Id. at 639.
23 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. The EEOC stated that a reproductive disorder
is a physical impairment that is considered a disability. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h)(1) (1999) (defining a "physical impairment" as "any physiological
disorder... affecting ... [the] reproductive [system]").
24 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1999).
25 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1999) (interpreting "substantially limits" in 29
C.F.R. § 1630.20)).
26 id.
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the individual from a broad range of various jobs carried out in
these buildings.27
"[T]he major categories of job discrimination faced by people
with disabilities include [the] use of standards that have the effect
of denying opportunities. 28 With that in mind, the drafters of the
ADA intended to eradicate standards that were not essential to job
performance but that prevented disabled individuals from acquiring
employment. 29 The ADA clearly states the purpose of the statute
was:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent enforceable stan-
dards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal government plays a central
role in enforcing these standards on behalf of individuals
with disabilities.3"
A qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA is an
employee-plaintiff who, "with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion .... [can] perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires."31 The individual
27 id.
28 AMERICANS wrrI DisABiLrriEs ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9.
29 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). "The term 'qualified individual with a
disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." Id. "Essential functions" is defined as "the
fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a
disability holds or desires." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1999). "The term 'essential
functions' does not include marginal functions of the position." Id.
'o 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1-3) (1994) (enumerating the purpose of the Act)
(emphasis added). See also S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 1 (stating purposes of the
Act).
3' 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). The EEOC gives deference to the
employer's judgment of what constitutes an essential function of the job. Id. If
the employer has some type of written job description, for example, an
advertisement, that description would be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job. Id. Reasonable accommodations may include "making
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
must be one "who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, educa-
tion, and other job-related requirements of the ... position. 32
Although the individual may have to satisfy certain employer
created criteria that is not essential to the job, this criteria cannot
be used to deny a disabled individual from job eligibility.33 For
instance:
[I]f a person with a disability applies for a job and meets
all the selection criteria except one that he or she cannot
meet because of a disability, the criteria must concern an
essential, non-marginal aspect of the job and be carefully
tailored to measure the persons's actual ability to do an
essential function of the job.34
Factors used to evaluate whether a function is essential include:
whether the position exists to perform a particular function; the
number of other employees available to perform that job function,
or among whom the performance of that job function can be
distributed; the degree of expertise or skill required to perform the
function; and the time spent performing the function.35 If a
disabled person cannot meet an essential function of the job, an
employer may lawfully decline to hire the person.36 If, however,
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities," and may also include "job restructuring, part-time
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabili-
ties." Id. § 12111(9)(A-B).
32 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1999).
33 S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 37-38 (1989).
34 Id. Litigation has demonstrated that a marginal function does not
necessarily mean a function that is rarely performed. Instead, activities that are
rarely performed but the "consequences of their nonperformance could be so
catastrophic" are essential functions and not marginal functions. Barber v. Nabors
Drilling U.S.A., Inc., 130 F.3d 702, 709 (5th Cir. 1997). If a minimum level
qualification for a position is listed, this would effectively demonstrate that the
qualification is an essential function of a job. Stinson v. West Suburban Hosp.
Med. Ctr., No. 97C 3701, 1998 WL 188938, *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1998). The
minimum qualification suggests that it is a prerequisite for hiring. Id.
3' 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1999).
36 id.
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a disabled individual can perform the essential function of the job
with reasonable accommodation, the employer may not deny
employment to that individual.37 Consequently, the statute enables
employers to decline to hire individuals who are not qualified for
the position" and balances the needs of employers against the
abilities of disabled individuals.
The ADA not only seeks to protect individuals with disabilities
from employment discrimination but also seeks to assure employers
that the quality of work performed by their disabled employees will
not be sacrificed.39 Once employers are convinced that the quality
of work will not suffer if they hire disabled individuals, less
discrimination will occur at the hiring level.4° Further, once the 43
million people with disabilities who are seeking employment have
overcome workplace discrimination, the ADA will fulfil its vision
"of an America where persons are judged by their abilities and not
on the basis of their disabilities. 41
The ADA's optimistic vision, however, has been blinded by the
Supreme Court's trilogy of decisions regarding "controlled
impairments."42 In fact, these decisions represent a victory for the
31 Id. The EEOC's interpretive guidance defines accommodation as "any
change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done that
enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities."
Id. Examples of reasonable accommodations include: job restructuring; modified
work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; and modifications of
equipment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1999).
38 S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 37-38.
39 Id.
' Id. at 17. Since its enactment in 1992, the ADA has been effective in
reducing unemployment among the disabled by almost three percent. See U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE ADA
(1998).
41 S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 19 (testimony of Sandy Parrino).
42 See, e.g., Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999) (holding
that a plaintiffs vision impairment that can be mitigated by the use of
subconscious adjustments is not considered substantially limited under the ADA);
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (holding that a plaintiffs
vision impairment that can be corrected with the use of corrective lenses is not
a "substantially limiting" disability within the meaning of the ADA); Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) (finding that a plaintiff's
hypertension that can be treated with the use of medication is not a "substantially
656
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employers at the expense of people who most need protection of
the ADA.43 When defining "disability," the drafters used epilepsy,
cancer, diabetes, hearing impairments, visual impairments and
HIV' as illustrative of eligible physical impairments covered by
the ADA.45 Further, the drafters found that epilepsy, diabetes,
emotional illness, and cancer were hidden disabilities in which
"information was often used to exclude applicants... before their
ability to perform the job was even evaluated." 46 Thus, Congress
intended that these disabilities especially be protected by the Act.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE "CONTROLLED
IMPAIRMENTS" LITIGATION
The vague language of the ADA and its requirement of
individualized consideration of a claimant's impairment47 resulted
in a deluge of cases in the courts requiring judges to determine
limiting" disability within the meaning of the ADA). See also Elizabeth Worth
Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Search for the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REv. 575 (1998)
(exploring the definition of disability and the concept of a controlled impair-
ment). A "controlled impairment" is defined as "one that would substantially
limit a major life activity if untreated, but that does not limit any such activity
when treated with some mitigating measure." Id. at 580.
13 Workers, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that "[e]mployers may now be able
to discriminate with impunity against individuals with epilepsy or diabetes"). See
also David Savage, Umbrella Starting to Close, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 43, 46
(concluding that "[d]isappointed disability rights advocates say the law has been
radically restricted").
4 HIV is the acronym for Human Immunodeficiency Virus. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 39 (26th ed. 1995). HIV is a retrovirus that causes AIDS.
Id. AIDS is a syndrome that attacks the human immune system. Id. HIV is
transmitted by exchange of body fluids, notably blood and semen, through sexual
contact, sharing needles, contact with contaminated blood, or transfusion of
contaminated blood products. Id. Moreover, people with HIV can still develop
health problems, including: pneumonia; cancer; and damage to the nervous
system. Id.
41 S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 22.
6id.
47 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994). Disabilities must be evaluated "with respect to
an individual" and be determined by whether an impairment substantially limits
the "major life activities of such individual." Id. § 12102(2).
657
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whether each individual is afflicted with a disability within the
meaning of the ADA. One pertinent issue that has arisen is whether
a person afflicted with a medical condition that is controlled by
medications or another means, thus limiting the disability's
interference with one or more major life activities, is disabled
under the ADA.4" While an employee may argue that she qualifies
for protection under the ADA because her impairment, if left
uncorrected, substantially limits her in a major life activity,49 an
employer may argue that the employee does not qualify for ADA
protection because the impairment can be or has been corrected by
mitigating measures and thus, does not substantially limit her in
major life activities, specifically working.50
EEOC regulations provide that a disability should be considered
without regard to mitigating measures.51 In an unusual departure
and in contrast to its decision in Bragdon v. Abbott,52 the Supreme
Court ignored the EEOC's guidelines, concluding that the EEOC
lacked the authority to interpret the term disability.53 The Court
typically has afforded great deference to EEOC regulations
concerning the ADA, and in Bragdon v. Abbott accepted the
EEOC's extended interpretation that HIV is a disability covered
" Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 88 (identifying this same issue in all three
disability cases the Supreme Court decided in June 1999).
' See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2144-45
(arguing that if plaintiffs' vision is left uncorrected they cannot effectively "see
to conduct numerous activities").
0 See, e.g., Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146 (arguing "an impairment does not
substantially limit a major life activity if it is corrected").
51 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1999) (interpreting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)). The
EEOC's regulations provide that mitigating measures should not be considered
when evaluating a "physical or mental impairment" in two separate sections. Id.
In the first reference, the regulations state, "(t)he existence of an impairment is
to be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or
assistant or prosthetic devices." Id. In the second reference, the regulations state
that the "substantially limits" determination must be made "on a case-by-case
basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistant or
prosthetic devices." Id. (interpreting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1999)).
52 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
" Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
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under the Act.54 The Supreme Court has held that regulation
decisions are to be given controlling weight unless they seem
"arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute." 55 Yet
in Sutton, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether
the EEOC's interpretive guidance regarding the determination of
disability warrants deference without even stating that the regula-
tions were contrary to the Act.56 The Court explained, "[a]lthough
the parties dispute the persuasive force of these interpretive
guidelines, we have no need in this case to decide what deference
is due. '57 The Court did conclude, however, that the EEOC has
not been given authority to interpret the term disability.5s More-
over, the Court failed to recognize Congress' intent that disabilities
that require self-help with mitigating measures, such as epilepsy,
diabetes and cancer be covered by the Act and instead only
afforded protection to one such "hidden disability," asymptomatic
54 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642. "The uniform body of administrative and
judicial precedent confins the conclusion [that asymptomatic HIV is covered
under the ADA] as the most faithful way to effect the congressional design." Id.
at 645.
55 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.
Id. at 843-44.
56 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999). The EEOC's regulations provide in two
sections that mitigating measures should not be considered when evaluating a
"physical or mental impairment." Id. In the first reference, the regulations state,
"(t)he existence of an impairment is to be determined without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." Id. In
the second reference, the regulations state that the "substantially limits"
determination must be made "on a case-by-case basis, without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." 29
C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1999).
5' Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
58 id.
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HIV, and not other "hidden disabilities," which were also recog-
nized by Congress to be disabilities covered by the ADA.59
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,6° Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.61 and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,62 the Supreme
Court held that individuals who use mitigating measures to correct
disabling impairments are not considered disabled if, as a result of
the corrective measure, the individuals are not substantially limited
in a major life activity.63 The Court identified high blood pressure
and deficient vision as correctable impairments because individuals
inflicted with these impairments can utilize measures to correct
them.64 Yet, the Court failed to give any guidance to identify what
impairments substantially limit an individual in a major life
activity.65 Its failure to do so resulted in a raised burden on the
plaintiff to achieve success under the ADA. This higher burden
59 AMERICANS WITH DIsABILrrIEs AcT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22
(1989).
60 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
61 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
62 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
63 See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2139. The Supreme Court found that the EEOC
guidelines requiring, "that persons be evaluated in their hypothetical uncorrected
state is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA." Id. at 2146.
Further, the Court stated that by [l]ooking at the Act [as] a whole, it
is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct, or mitigate,
a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures-both
positive and negative-must be taken into account when judging
whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity
and thus 'disabled' under the Act.
Id.
4 Id. at 2149 (holding that the determination of whether an individual is
disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual's
impairment). See also Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2169 (holding that impaired
vision that is compensated by subconscious mechanisms of the body is not a
disability that is substantially limiting when corrected); Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at
2139 (holding that because hypertension is corrected with mitigating measures,
such as medication, the plaintiff is not substantially limited in the job market but
only disqualified for this particular job).
65 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149. The Court stated that there are "individuals
who take medicine to lessen the symptoms of an impairment so that they can
function but nevertheless remain substantially limited." Id.
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prevents plaintiffs from successfully being deemed as "substantially
limited" in a major life activity while utilizing mitigating measures.
The Supreme Court did not provide substantive reasons for
finding impairments controlled by medication or other devices as
not warranting protection under the ADA. Rather, the Court
buttressed its decisions with the verbiage of the Act, stating that
"substantially limits appears in the Act in the present indicative
verb form ... [and] the language is properly read as requiring that
a person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substan-
tially limited in order to demonstrate a disability."'  Thus, the
disability only exists where "an impairment 'substantially limits' a
major life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be
substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken."67
The Court ultimately concluded that "a person whose physical or
mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures
does not have an impairment that presently 'substantially limits' a
major life activity. '61 Consequently, the Court created categories
of impairments no longer protected under the ADA.
A. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 69
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the petitioners were twin
sisters who had severe myopia.7" The sisters, Karen Sutton and
Kimberly Hinton, brought a disability discrimination action against
United Air Lines under the ADA.7' The petitioners challenged the
airline's minimum vision requirement for global pilots because they
were denied interviews and pilot positions. 72 The petitioners met
all of the job requirements except the vision requirement.7 3 The
66 id.
67 id.
68 Id. at 2146-47.
69 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
70 Id. at 2143. Myopia is an optical condition in which only rays from a
finite distance from the eye focus on the retina. STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 1170 (26th ed. 1995). Myopia is commonly referred to as nearsightedness.
Id.
71 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2139.
72 id.
73 Id.
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airline required that the petitioners have 20/100 minimum uncor-
rected vision.74 The petitioners had 20/200 vision in their right
eye and 20/400 vision in their left eye. 75 With the use of correc-
tive lenses, however, their vision was 20/20 in both eyes.76 The
Sutton sisters claimed that they were disabled, because without
corrective lenses, they could not "effectively . .. see to conduct
numerous activities such as driving a vehicle, watching television
or shopping in public stores. 77 Their claim was premised upon
two arguments. First, that the defendant discriminated against them
"because [the defendant] regarded the petitioners as having a
disability., 78 The petitioners claimed the airline's vision require-
ment was based on stereotype, and the requirement prevented them
from obtaining a job as a global airline pilot, a class of employ-
ment.79 Thus, the petitioners contended that the airline "mistaken-
ly believe[d] their physical impairments substantially limited them
in the major life activity of working."8 ° The second argument
rested on the first prong of the definition of disability.8" The
petitioners argued that they "possess[ed] a physical impairment that
substantially limited them in one or more major life activities." In
order for the Court to decide whether the applicants had a substan-
tially limiting disability, it had to first determine whether the
impairment should be evaluated with or without reference to
corrective measures.82
In addressing the "regarded as" argument, the Court concluded
that the petitioners did not demonstrate that the airline regarded
them as disabled, because the minimum vision requirement alone
failed to establish a claim that the airline regarded the petitioners
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 id.
17 Id. at 2143.
78 Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994) (defining "disability" with respect
to an individual as "being regarded as having such an impairment").
71 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2146. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) (defining "disability" as
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities").
82 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
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as substantially limited in a major life activity. In fact, the Court
stated "that an employer is free to decide that physical characteris-
tics or medical conditions... that are limiting... make individu-
als less ... suited for a job. '83 The Court held that the airline did
not regard the individuals as substantially limited in a major life
activity but rather regarded their poor vision as precluding them
from holding positions as global airline pilots.' The Court
decided that, "when the major life activity ... is working, the
statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, that
plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of
jobs. 85 Thus, if the applicants were employable in a broad class
of jobs, they cannot be substantially limited.86 Because the
position of a global airline pilot is a single type of job, the Court
decided that the petitioners were not excluded from a broad class
of jobs.87
Petitioners maintained that whether an impairment is substan-
tially limiting should be determined without regard to corrective
measures in consonance with EEOC regulations that direct that the
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited be
made without regard to mitigating measures.88 The respondent, in
turn, maintained that an impairment does not substantially limit a
major life activity if it is corrected. It argued that the Court should
not defer to the agency guidelines because they are in conflict with
the plain meaning of the ADA89 and are an impermissible interp-
retation of the ADA. 90
Considering these arguments, the Court held that "a person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or
other measures does not have an impairment that presently
83 id.
8 Id. at 2150.
85 Id. at 2151.
86 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1999). 'The inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working." Id.
87 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
88 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20).
89 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
90 Id.
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substantially limits a major life activity."9' The Court agreed with
the respondent and found that the EEOC's guidelines, requiring that
persons be evaluated in their unmitigated state, were contrary to the
ADA's individualized inquiry requirement. This mandate forces
employers "to make a disability determination based on general
information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects
individuals, rather than an individual's actual condition., 92 Thus,
when the Court evaluated the visual impairment suffered by the
petitioners, it concluded that because they "function identically to
individuals without a similar impairment" they were not substan-
tially limited in a major life activity.93
Focusing on Congress' findings that "some 43 million Ameri-
cans have one or more physical or mental disabilities," 94 the Court
excluded some of those originally considered as disabled and
concluded that the 43 million people Congress desired to protect
under the Act included only those with "activity limitations.""
Persons with activity limitations include those who, relative to their
age and sex group, could not conduct usual activities.96 Thus, the
Court found that, "[hlad Congress intended to include all [the]
persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by
the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of
disabled persons in the findings."97 As Justice Stevens stated in
his dissent, the Court excluded "from the Act's protected class
individuals with controllable conditions such as diabetes and severe
9' Id. at 2146-47.
92 Id. at 2147.
9' Id. at 2149.
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). See also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
9' Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (finding that a functional approach, which
defines disability as limitations on performing certain basic activities when using
special aids, led to a number of disabled consistent with the congressional
findings listed in the Act, rather than a nonfunctional approach, which defined
disability by looking at all of the health conditions that impair health or normal
abilities of an individual, that yielded much higher amounts of disabled people
when omitting mitigating measures).
96 Id. at 2148.
97 Id. at 2149.
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hypertension that were expressly understood as substantially
limiting impairments."98
Since the Supreme Court in Sutton focused on Congress'
numbers and did not look beyond the facts of the case, they failed
to consider the issues at the heart of the ADA.99 While the
Court's rule may fit the facts of the Sutton case, the rule will be
difficult to apply to future ADA cases. The Sutton case is different
from most other types of disability cases for several reasons. First,
vision cases deal with impairments and corrective measures that
affect a large majority of the United States' population. 1°° Sec-
ond, the case dealt with employment in a highly regulated
field.101 Lastly, the airline's reasons for heightened hiring qualifi-
cations were for the protection of the public.0 2 Cases involving
other disabilities are not as easy to evaluate because they involve
a more complicated analysis of the corrective measures.
B. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc."°
3
Vaughn L. Murphy, a mechanic, sued his employer, United
Parcel Service ("UPS"), under the ADA when he was terminated
upon discovery that his blood pressure exceeded Department of
Transportation ("DOT"') requirements for drivers of commercial
98 Id. at 2160-61 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
99 "Bad cases make bad law." Sinclair, supra note 9, at 3. The problem with
Sutton is that nearsightedness is not a major disability and that the case deals
with the Federal Aviation Administration regulations, which are given deference.
Sinclair, supra note 9, at 3.
"0 The number of people in the United States with vision impairments is
100 million. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149 (citing National Advisory Eye Council,
Vision Research-A National Plan: Hearing and Hearing Impairment (Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services 1996)).
"0l See 14 C.F.R. § 67.203(a) (1999). The Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") has instituted vision requirements for pilots. Id.
102 The FAA wanted to insure that pilots would not have a visual condition
that would interfere with flying the airplane. Id. § 67.203(e) (pilots cannot have
an "acute or chronic pathological condition of either eye. . . that interferes with
the proper function of an eye ... or that may reasonably be expected to be
aggravated by flying").
103 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
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vehicles. °4 In an unmedicated state his blood pressure was very
high at 250/160.105 The DOT regulations prescribed that a driver
of a commercial vehicle in interstate commerce cannot have a
"current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere
with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely. ' °6
When Murphy was tested to satisfy the clinical requirements, his
blood pressure was 160/102.107 UPS fired Murphy because his
blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of
commercial motor vehicles. 10 8
To determine whether Murphy was disabled within the meaning
of the ADA, the Court considered two questions. Again, the
threshold issue for the Court was whether mitigating measures
should be considered when determining "whether under the ADA,
an individual's impairment 'substantially limits' one or more major
life activities. '""'° Relying on Sutton, the Court concluded that
when medicated, Murphy's blood pressure did not limit him in any
major life activity.10 Thus, considering the petitioner's disability
in light of the mitigating measures, he was found not to be disabled
within the meaning of the ADA.11'
The Court then questioned whether the respondent fired the
petitioner because it regarded him as disabled1 12 as a result of its
'04 Id. at 2136.
'05 Id. Borderline blood pressure is characterized as a systolic pressure no
higher than 160 and a diastolic pressure no higher than 95. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 831 (26th ed. 1995). Systolic blood pressure is the top number of
the ratio which represents the pressure generated when the heart contracts. Mi
Young Hwang, Why Should You Be Concerned about High Blood Pressure?, 281
J. AM. MED. ASS'N 484 (1999). The diastolic blood pressure is the bottom
number of the ratio which represents the pressure in the vessels when the heart
is between contractions. Id. One in four Americans has high blood pressure. Id.
106 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(6) (1999).
107 Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136. This diagnosis is considered high blood
pressure. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 831 ( 26th ed. 1995) (defining
"high blood pressure").
108 Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
109 Id. at 2137.
110 Id.
.. Id. at 2139.
112 Id. at 2137. See also 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(C) (1994) (defining
"disability" as "being regarded as having such an impairment").
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mistaken belief that he was substantially limited in the major life
activity of working." 3 The Court relying on Sutton 14 held that
the petitioner demonstrated that he was only unable to meet the job
requirements of a mechanic position when the job required him to
drive a commercial vehicle. 15 The district court concluded that
driving a commercial vehicle was an essential function of this
position.1 6 The petitioner did not challenge this finding. Thus,
relying on the district court's conclusion that driving a commercial
vehicle was an essential function of the position, the Supreme
Court concluded that Murphy did not satisfy this function because
he could not meet the DOT certification. 117 Moreover, although
the petitioner did not fulfill the requirements for this particular
mechanic position, he was able to secure another job as a mechanic
shortly after leaving UPS.1 18 Because Murphy was employable as
a mechanic in another position, the Court concluded that, "at most,
the petitioner was regarded as unable to perform only a particular
job." '119 This was insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that
the petitioner was regarded as disabled by UPS, because the
inability to perform only a particular job is not grounds for a
disability claim under the statute.12 ° In fact, the EEOC regulations
concede that an individual must be unemployable in a broad class
of employment in a field.1 21 As Murphy was qualified for several
other mechanic positions, the array of positions available to him
was considered a class of jobs for which he was employable. Thus,
113 Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
14 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2150-51 (1999).
115 Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138.
116 Id. at 2136 (citing Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872,
882-83 (D. Kan. 1996)).
117 Id. at 2138.
18 Id. at 2139.
"9 Id. at 2139.
120 Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(3)(i) (1999). "The inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major
life activity of working." Id.
12 See id. § 1630.20)(3). "The term substantially limits means significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes." Id.
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the Court found he did not meet the requirements necessary for
protection under the ADA.
C. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
12
In Albertsons, an employee truck driver, Hallie Kirkingburg,
was fired by his employer, the supermarket chain Albertsons, Inc.,
because he did not meet the DOT's vision standards. 123 Kirking-
burg suffered from amblyopia,' 24 an uncorrectable condition that
left him with monocular vision. 12' Even after obtaining a waiver
of the DOT's standards, his employer did not rehire him.126
Kirkingburg then brought an ADA action against his former
employer.127
It was undisputed that Kirkingburg's amblyopia was a physical
impairment and that seeing is a major life activity.128 The ques-
tion was whether monocular vision alone "substantially limited"
Kirkingburg in the major life activity of seeing. 129 Kirkingburg
122 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
123 Id. at 2165. The DOT's vision requirements required corrected distant
visual acuity of at least 20/40 in each eye and distant binocular acuity of at least
20/40. 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(10) (1999).
124 Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2166-65. Amblyopia is a suppression of the
central vision in one eye when the images from the two eyes are so different that
they cannot be fused into one. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 56 (26th ed.
1995).There are several possible causes of this condition: 1) a suppression of
central vision in one eye due to faulty image formation; 2) a suppression of
central vision in two eyes pointing in different directions; or 3) a suppression of
central vision due to two images of different sizes, unable to be fused so that the
blurrier image is suppressed. Id.
'2 Monocular vision is visibility in one eye only. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIoNARY 1126 (26th ed. 1995).
126 Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2166. The DOT had a system since 1992 that
allowed commercial drivers with three years commercial driving experience but
inflicted with deficient vision to waive the requirements and retain DOT
certification. Id. at 2167. The driver could not have had a license suspension or
revocation, a moving violation, conviction for driving related offenses, or any
serious traffic violations. Id.
127 Id. at 2166.
'28 Id. at 2167.
129 Id. at 2168.
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provided evidence that his brain developed subconscious mecha-
nisms for compensating his disability.13 Kirkingburg had
"learned to compensate for the disability by making subconscious
adjustments to the manner in which he sensed depth and perceived
peripheral objects." '131
As it had in Sutton, the Court determined that mitigating
measures should be considered when evaluating a disability, and
therefore, evaluated Kirkingburg's subconscious compensation for
his disability. 3 2 The Court stated that there was "no principled
basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial
aids, like medications or devices, and measures undertaken,
whether consciously or not, with the body's own system." '33
Thus, the Court decided that because a mitigating measure was
available, Kirkingburg had to prove that even with this mitigating
measure, he was substantially limited in a major life activity.M
To complete this determination, the Court required that he prove
his disability by "offering evidence that the extent of the limitation
in terms of [his] own experience, as in loss of depth perception and
visual field, [was] substantial.' 13 5
In addition, the Court considered the DOT's decision to waive
the vision requirements and provide Kirkingburg with DOT
certification. 136 Despite the fact that the federal agency waived
the minimum vision requirement, 37 the Court stated that this
130 Id.
131 id.
132 Id. at 2169.
133 id.
134 id.
135 id.
136 Id. at 2166. DOT certification is granted to:
[Aipplicants with deficient vision who had three years of recent
experience driving a commercial vehicle without a license suspension
or revocation, involvement in a reportable accident in which the
applicant was cited for a moving violation, conviction for certain
driving related offenses, citation for certain serious traffic violations or
more than two convictions for any other moving violations.
Id.
137 Id. at 2166. "In early 1993, after he had left Albertsons, Kirkingburg
received a DOT waiver, but Albertsons refused to rehire him." Id.
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waiver did not imply that the employer had to rehire
Kirkingburg. 38 The Court essentially disregarded the waiver and
never reached the decision of whether Kirkingburg was or was not
disabled under the ADA because it disposed of the case on the
grounds that Kirkingburg was unable to meet federal vision
standards with or without reasonable accommodation. 139
In Albertsons, the federal agency made it clear that the vision
qualification was not essential to the job because the agency
waived it."4 The Court, however, found that even if the federal
agency waived the qualifications, the employer could still deny
employment to the individual. 41 The agency waived the qualifi-
cation in an experimental program to eradicate standards, such as
these, that were not essential to such transportation positions as the
one at hand. The agency found Kirkingburg eligible for the
program because he met the excellent driving standards required
under the program. 42 The Court, however, decided that because
the waiver program was not based on any factual conclusion
conducive to public safety and was merely experimental in nature,
an employer did not have to jeopardize its employee's safety by
138 Id. at 2174. The Court stated that the waiver regulation did not require
an employer to participate in the experiment. Id. The waiver program was an
experiment of the Federal Highway Administration to conduct a study comparing
the group of experienced, visually deficient drivers with a control group of
experienced drivers who meet the vision standards. Id. This experiment was to
allow the Federal Highway Administration to reevaluate their vision standards
in the context of actual driver performance in relation to the latest medical
technology. Id. The Court did not want to burden employers who attempted to
comply with the DOT certification requirements with an experimental waiver. Id.
"9 Id. at 2170 (finding that Kirkingburg was unable to meet the vision
standards). "The federal vision standards were an essential function of the job
required by a regulation wholly out of the control of the employer." Id. at 2171.
140 Id. at 2166.
141 Id. at 2174.
142 Id. at 2166. People with deficient vision were given DOT certification if
they met the following requirements: three years of recent commercial vehicle
driving experience; no revocation or suspension of a license; and no involvement
in a reportable accident in which the individual was cited for a traffic violation.
Id. In order to be a part of the program, a waiver applicant had to agree to have
his vision checked annually for deterioration. Id.
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submitting to this well intended experiment. 43 Thus, the Court
failed to recognize that the intent of the ADA's drafters was to
eradicate exactly this type of obstacle.
In denying the force of the experimental waiver, the Supreme
Court also ignored the Act's definition of the term discriminate.
The ADA provides:
[Q]ualification standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria that screen out ... an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities [cannot
be used] unless the standard test or other selection criteria
... is shown to be job related for the position in question
and is consistent with business necessity.144
The federal agency waived the vision standard for the same reasons
the ADA was enacted. "The impetus of developing the waiver
program was a concern that the existing substantive standard might
be more demanding than safety required."' 14 Thus, the Supreme
Court did not heed the purpose of the Act-"to eradicate the use
of standards that have the effect of denying opportunities."'
46
The Court's analysis of the first prong of the definition of
disability under the Act, which states that the term disability means
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual,"' 47 also failed
to recognize much of the force behind the ADA, because it was
interpreted in isolation. The Court limited its analysis and did not
consider the other parts of the definition of disability as well as the
collateral issues involved in the type of jobs the applicants were
pursuing. First, the interpretation of the ADA's definition of
disability should be interpreted with reference to the entire statute
and not just one isolated sentence.148 Thus, taken as a whole, a
143 Id. at 2174.
'4442 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994) (defining the term "discriminate").
145 Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2172.
'46AmERicANs wTrH DIsABILIrIES ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 101-116, at
37-38 (1989).
147 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
' See Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 372 (1994). The Supreme
Court has emphasized that statutory determination of definitions should not be
made with reference to a single word or phrase but instead the Court should
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disability should be considered without reference to mitigating
measures because the statute defining disability would then be
superfluous. 4 9 This section of the statute allows a plaintiff to
define a disability by a record of the impairment. Thus, those who
were once considered disabled but who are now fully recovered are
also protected under Subsection B of the Act. 5°
The Court, however, has failed to recognize that consideration
of mitigating measures makes it virtually impossible for any
plaintiff who is addressing a disability with self-help to redress an
unjust act by an employer. Thus, it has inadvertently forced the
disabled to argue, pursuant to Subsection C of the Act, 5' that the
employer has regarded the individual as disabled. The Court also
used Murphy to limit the causes of action under this third
prong. 5 The Court held that "a person is regarded as disabled
within the meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly
believes that the person's actual, non-limiting impairment substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities."'53 Thus, the Court
has subsumed the "substantial limitation" analysis, once reserved
for the first prong of the statute, into the third prong of the statute,
attempting to foreclose this alternative pleading as an option for the
disabled. '14
Proponents of the narrow interpretation of the trilogy of cases
believe the limited interpretation of the ADA was necessary to curb
unnecessary and frivolous lawsuits. This underlying belief,
however, will be inapplicable to a number of discrimination cases
brought before the courts. Instead, the trilogy will likely generate
focus on "the plain meaning of the whole statute, not of isolated sentences." Id.
149 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994) (defining disability by record of the
impairment).
150 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2154 (1999) (Stevens,
J. dissenting).
151 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
152 Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 (1999).
153 Id.
154 This analysis assumes that if an impairment is not considered substantial-
ly limiting under Subsection A of the Act, the plaintiff cannot be perceived as
substantially limited under Subsection C of the Act. REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE
ADA 254 (Sept. 1998). Thus, the plaintiff cannot be considered disabled. Id.
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further litigation. First, those who are dismissed because they
cannot prove that they are substantially limited at the district court
level will seek more appeals.'55 Second, there will be an increase
in litigation as to the types of disabilities that have mitigating
measures but that are still covered by the ADA.5 6 Thus, the
Court was mistaken in its belief that its decision would make the
federal courts more efficient.
Supporters of the trilogy also argue that the narrow interpreta-
tion was necessary to control employers' insurance rates. 157
Employers need to protect themselves from suits by disabled
employees who are injured on the job. By erring on the side of
employers, however, the Supreme Court mistakenly took the
"heart" out of the ADA. 158 Now, employers can refuse to hire a
fully qualified individual because of the misperceptions of an
individual's disability and there will be no legal protection for the
individual if a mitigating measure is utilized.'59
III. A BLANKET EXCLUSION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE
DISABLED
The Supreme Court's analysis of the meaning of disability in
this trilogy of cases prevents individuals from falling under the
umbrella protection of the ADA who are diagnosed with diseases
15' Sinclair, supra note 9, at 15.
156 Sinclair, supra note 9, at 15.
157 Sinclair, supra note 9, at 3 ("this decision is a form of insurance
discrimination"). Corporate managers argue that [Murphy] slows down the
growing deluge of ADA lawsuits. Lynette Clemetson, A Sharper Image of Bias,
NEWSWEEK, July 5, 1999, at 27.
158 Clemetson, supra note 157, at 27.
5 Workers, supra note 11, at 4. Bennet Klein, an employment discrimina-
tion attorney who argued the landmark HIV/ADA case, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624 (1998), stated that "an employer may now refuse to hire a fully
qualified job candidate simply because the individual has diabetes, and there will
be no legal review of that job decision." Workers, supra note 11, at 4.
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such as, diabetes,"6 epilepsy, 61 or cancer.162 A case-by-case
analysis of these impairments demonstrates that individuals
inflicted with either epilepsy, diabetes or cancer will almost never
be considered disabled under the Supreme Court's analysis because
treatment may be available for each of these hidden disabilities
that, when utilized, will maintain the disorder. The maintained
disabilities which are more complicated than corrected disabilities,
are distinguishable from corrected disabilities because a maintained
disability has the chance of recurring as a result of extraneous
factors that are beyond the control of the afflicted individual.
Therefore, while an individual living with a maintainable disability
can pursue activities without substantial limitation, their disability
could recur and affect a major life activity at any time.
In the post-Sutton era, however, impairments that can be
maintained with mitigating measures, but that are not necessarily
corrected, will be denied ADA protection unjustly. Justice Stevens,
in his dissent in Sutton, illustrated this point arguing that, the
majority's decision holds that "one who continues to wear a
hearing aid that she has worn all her life might not be covered...
[because] fully cured impairments are covered but merely treatable
160 Diabetes mellitus is a condition in which carbohydrate utilization is
reduced while utilization of lipid and protein production is increased. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 878 (26th ed. 1995). It is caused by a deficiency of
insulin. Id.
161 Epilepsy is a chronic disorder due to excessive release of neurons
associated with various alterations of a patient's consciousness. Id. at 584. Such
alterations of consciousness include: 1) attacks by which a person is unaware of
the loss of consciousness; 2) momentary spells of impaired consciousness; or 3)
focal convulsions. Id. Epileptics are afflicted with a seizure that affects the
motor, sensory, reflex, psychic or vegetative conditions. Id. Patients are afflicted
with a seizure that affects either the motor, sensory, reflex, psychic or vegetative
conditions. Id. The epileptic condition can be life threatening because a series of
seizures or a seizure that lasts longer than 30 minutes can deprive the brain of
oxygen or cause heart or kidney failure. Margie Patlack, Controlling Epilepsy,
FDA CONSUMER, May 1992, at 28, 29.
162 Cancer is a general term frequently used to indicate any of various types
of malignant tumors, which invade surrounding tissues, and are likely to recur
after attempted removal and to cause death of the patient. Id. at 268.
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ones are not."1 63 Because the Supreme Court based its opinion on
a visual acuity impairment, a disability easily corrected with
glasses, the lower courts will have a difficult time balancing the
interests involved in maintainable impairments litigation, where a
disability cannot be remedied but the individual is able to perform
many life activities without impairment by the disability.
As a result of the Sutton decision and its progeny, individuals
using hypertension medication, corrective vision lenses, or some
sort of self-accommodation are excluded from ADA protection.'
This categorical exclusion conflicts with the intent of the Act's
framers to have the courts conduct individualized analyses of
claimants' disabilities. Because the Act was to be applied on a
case-by-case basis, no per se categories of disability were created.
Prior to Sutton, however, some lower courts demonstrated a
willingness to accept, epilepsy, diabetes, cancer and even some
emotional illnesses as disabilities. Nonetheless, the post-Sutton
cases now reveal that the lower courts are being forced to apply the
Supreme Court's mitigating measures analysis as a "blanket
exclusion," which in effect, nullifies the ADA requirement of case-
by-case analysis of each individual's disorder. 65 As a result, the
disabled are left with the more difficult task of proving that their
employers regard them as disabled. Consequently, the future of
protection for the disabled under the ADA is uncertain. 66
163 Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2154 (1999) (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
'64 Sinclair, supra note 9, at 15. "[W]e know for sure that if you wear
corrective lenses and take medication to control high blood pressure you are not
going to get the ADA's help." Id.
15 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (stating the determination of disability must
be made "with respect to an individual").
16 Sinclair, supra note 9, at 15 (conceding that "all parties agree that the
ADA now covers fewer people, and the scope of the law has been narrowed
considerably").
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A. Cancer and Treatment
Cancer is a group of over one hundred different diseases that
currently affect more than 8.4 million Americans. 167 All forms of
cancer involve the growth of abnormal cells that multiply without
control and destroy healthy body tissue.168 Normally, cells divide
and grow to keep a person healthy.' 69 However, when cells
continue to divide even though new cells are unnecessary, these
new cells accumulate and form a mass of extra tissue called a
tumor.170 The dividing and growing cells may even spread to
other parts of the body, attacking healthy tissue. 7 '
Despite modem medical advances, cancer is not a correctable
disability. 7 2 People who suffer from cancer are treated with a
variety of medical treatments including: surgery;' 73 radiation
167 CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2000, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, INC. 1
(2000) [hereinafter CANCER].
'68 Id. at 2.
169 NATIONAL CANCER INST., CHEMOTHERAPY AND You 2 (1999)
[hereinafter CHEMOTHERAPY].
170 NATIONAL CANCER INST., WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CANCER
2 (1993) [hereinafter NEED TO KNOW].
171 CHEMOTHERAPY, supra note 169, at 2.
172 A cancer recurrence is the reappearance of the disease that was thought
to be cured or inactive. NATIONAL CANCER INST., WHEN CANCER RECURS 3
(1997) [hereinafter RECURS]. "Cancer is more like a lifelong, chronic disease that
needs[s] to be manage[d] rather than something the doctors can cure once and
for all." NATIONAL CANCER INST., FACING FORWARD: A GUIDE FOR CANCER
SURVIVORS 6 (1996) [hereinafter FACING FORWARD].
171 Surgery removes the tumor causing the cancer. CANCER, supra note 167,
at 1. Because surgery may result in removing organs it has several physical and
psychological consequences on the patient. Barrie Anderson and Susan
Lutgendorf, Quality of Life in Gynecologic Cancer Survivors, CA. CANCER J.
CLINICIANS, July/Aug. 1997, at 218, 220. For example, some gynecological
cancer survivors must undergo a hysterectomy, which is a complete removal of
the uterus, resulting in infertility, sexual dysfunction, and gender identity issues.
Id. See also STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 842 (26th ed. 1995). Some courts
have even found that a mastectomy to treat breast cancer substantially limits a
major life activity, such as working. Berk v. Bates Advert. USA, Inc., No. 94
CIV. 9140, 1997 WL 749386, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997). The court in Berk
relied upon a Supreme Court case stating that "hospitalization is a fact more than
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therapy; 74 chemotherapy; 175 and hormone therapy. 176 In some
sufficient to establish that one or more ... major life activities were substantially
limited." School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987). See
also Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 777 n.39 (E.D.
Tex. 1996) (finding that "the record was developed well enough for the court to
declare as a matter of law that the testicular cancer was... a disability" because
Anderson was subject to surgery and irradiation of the testicles).
174 Radiation therapy aims to kill the cancerous cells to keep them from
growing and multiplying. NATIONAL CANCER INST., RADIATION THERAPY AND
You 5 (1999) [hereinafter RADIATION THERAPY]. Radiation has varying effects
on the individuals who undergo this treatment. Id. at 27. The effects can be acute
or chronic. Id. Acute side effects occur immediately after treatment begins and
remain only for a few weeks. Id. Chronic side effects may take months or years
to appear and are usually permanent. Id. Chronic side effects can consist of
fibrosis or atrophy of permanent tissue that affect tissue tolerance of ultraviolet
radiation. Anderson and Lutgendorf, supra note 173, at 221. A persons's freedom
of movement may also be limited because of bowel movement problems.
Anderson and Lutgendorf, supra note 173, at 221.
171 Chemotherapy is the treatment of disease by means of chemical
substances or drugs. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 321 (26th ed. 1995).
Anticancer drugs destroy cancer cells by preventing them from dividing.
CHEMOTHERAPY, supra note 169, at 2. Chemotherapy is administered in cycles
that alternate with rest periods in one of several ways: intravenously; orally;
topically; or injected intramuscularly. CHEMOTHERAPY, supra note 169, at 9.
Chemotherapy has serious side effects with possible long term impact on energy
levels and functions of several organs. CHEMOTHERAPY, supra note 169, at 15.
Other side effects while receiving chemotherapy treatment include: fatigue, which
appears suddenly and is not subsided by rest; severe nausea and vomiting;
damage to nerves causing shooting pain; numbness; burning or tingling in the
extremities; hair loss in all parts of the body; low red blood cell count causing
fatigue, dizziness and shortness of breath; interfered functioning of the central
nervous system; susceptibility to infections; inability to create platelets necessary
for blood-clotting; bowel problems, such as diarrhea or constipation; permanent
renal damage; and effect on sexual organs, such as lowering sperm count in men,
resulting in infertility, erectile dysfunction, infertility in women, declined interest
in intercourse. CHEMOTHERAPY, supra note 169, at 15-27.
176 Hormone Therapy is used to treat cancers that rely on hormones,
chemicals produced by glands and circulated in the bloodstream to control the
actions of certain cells or organs, to grow. NEED TO KNOW, supra note 170, at
14. Hormone therapy can include removing the organ that makes the hormones
on which the cancer is depending to grow. NEED TO KNOW, supra note 170, at
14. It can also include using drugs to prevent the organ from producing the
hormone or changing the way the hormone functions. NEED TO KNOW, supra
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cases, a patient may be in remission after treatment."' Remission
is a complete or partial disappearance of the signs and symptoms
of cancer.178 However, remission may not be a cure because an
individual may have a recurrence after a period in which the
disease was considered under control. 179 Thus, the cancer may lie
dormant, ready to re-strike its victim at any time.
181
Individuals diagnosed with cancer are discriminated against in
the workplace. 18 Discrimination is based on fear and the stigma
associated with cancer. 182 Of the eight million people living in
the United States with a history of cancer, at least half of them are
struggling to become "gainfully employed" without discrimina-
tion. 183
Under the Supreme Court's mitigating measures analysis,
cancer patients undergoing medical treatment will not be consid-
ered disabled once the treatment is complete. Thus, it seems that
courts will find cancer to be a "corrected" impairment. However,
if the patient's cancer recurs, the courts again would have to
note 170, at 14. Hormone therapy can have long term side effects, causing
infertility in both men and women, severe nausea and vomiting, hot flashes, and
weight gain. NEED TO KNOW, supra note 170, at 17.
177 Remission is the abatement or lessening of the symptoms of a disease.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1526 (26th ed. 1995).
178 Id.
179 RECURS, supra note 172, at 3. A recurrence is the reappearance of the
disease that was thought to be cured or in remission. Cancer may recur after
several weeks, months or years. RECURS, supra note 172, at 4. The recurrent
cancer is usually caused by tissue from an earlier episode of cancer, which had
been treated, but not eradicated. RECURS, supra note 172, at 4. Because some of
the cancer survived the treatment, it is the same cancer even though it reappears
in another portion of the body. RECURS, supra note 172, at 4. Beginning cancer
treatment again places huge demands on the individual's spirit and body.
RECURS, supra note 172, at 4.
180 AMERICANS wrrH DisAiLrriEs ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 101-116, at
39 (1989). Cancer is considered one of the "hidden disabilities" to be protected
by this Act. Id.
181 Ian Ziegler, When Cancer Comes to Work, Bus. & HEALTH, July 1998,
at 34, 36.
182 See id. at 34."Employees with cancer were fired or laid off five times
more frequently than their cancer-free colleagues." Id. at 36.
183 Id. at 34.
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undertake an analysis to decide whether the individual is substan-
tially limited in a major life activity. This is not only inefficient but
would effectively deny individuals with cancer ADA protection
because such an analysis makes cancer a temporary disability.
184
A temporary disability is one that does not substantially limit a
major life activity for more than several months.'85 Courts do not
consider temporary disabilities, which are intermittent or episodic,
such as arthritis, 186 worthy of ADA protection.1 8 7 Analyzing
cancer after every recurrence will convert cancer into an identifi-
able temporary disability not covered under the ADA's umbrella
protection.1 88 This is contrary to the purpose of the ADA, which
was enacted to prevent disabled individuals who are disabled for
more than several months but capable of working, from employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of their disability.1 89
The Supreme Court's definition of disability will have the
effect of a "blanket exclusion" when analyzing a mitigating
measures case involving cancer because the burden placed on the
petitioners to prove that they are substantially limited even while
receiving anti-cancer treatment will be difficult to overcome.190
"8 See EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997),
vacated in part, 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding cancer that is in remission
not a substantially limiting disability). Temporary injuries are not viewed as
substantially limiting a major life activity. Christopher Cramer and Ursula L.
Haerter, Does ADA Protect Temporary Disabilities?, 10 CONN. EMPLOYMENT L.
LETTER 3 (1999). "[S]urgery related absences from work and short-term working
restrictions afterward do not constitute sufficient limitations to make this
impairment a disability under the ADA." Id.
185 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 21, at 8.
186 Arthritis is an inflammation of a joint, particularly in the hands and feet.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 149 (26th ed. 1995).
187 See, e.g., Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1995). See also
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995).
'88 A temporary impairment is too short of duration to be considered
"substantially limiting" for purposes of the ADA. Adams v. Citizens Advice
Bureau, No. 99-7131, 1999 WL 635612, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 20, 1999).
189 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994). "It is the purpose of this chapter to...
address the major areas of discrimination faced day to day by people with
disabilities." Id.
"9 Sinclair, supra note 9, at 3 (arguing that civil rights law should be
"loosely construed," and that because it is not many disabled people are "carved
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This threshold may be insurmountable, however, because an
individual diagnosed with cancer can perform the essential
functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation.
Because the individual can work, under the Court's bright-line test
the individual may not be able to show that the condition is
substantially limiting. The treatment, however, used by an individu-
al diagnosed with cancer can have severe side effects such as those
associated with chemotherapy and, thus, may substantially limit an
individual in a major life activity. 91 Side effects during treatment
may be so severe that patients may schedule their therapy on a
Friday, allowing the weekend to recuperate, so that they may return
to work on Monday. 192 Nonetheless, the ADA's safeguards,
against employment discrimination, have been stripped when the
individual utilizes a device that aids in overcoming the full effect
of the disability. 193
The difficulty for the plaintiff to meet the "substantial limita-
tion" criteria was demonstrated recently in EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher
Co.194 In Gallagher, the petitioner, Michael Boyle, brought a law
suit against his employer claiming disability discrimination due to
his myeldoysplastic syndrome ("MDS"), a form of blood can-
cer. 195 Boyle had worked for the defendant for over twenty years,
entering into one-year contracts with his employer with the option
to renew each year.196 In 1991, the employment contract was
extended for three years and in 1993, Boyle was promoted to
president.197 In the same year, Boyle was diagnosed with MDS
having to undergo aggressive chemotherapy treatments that caused
out" of the definition of disability).
191 See CHEMOTHERAPY, supra note 169, at 15-27.
192 See Ziegler, supra note 181, at 34.
193 Workers, supra note 11, at 4 (identifying the recent Supreme Court
rulings as a Catch-22 for people with disabilities).
'94 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997), vacated in part, 181 F.3d 645 (5th
Cir. 1999) (finding cancer that is in remission not a substantially limiting
disability).
195 Gallagher, 181 F.3d at 648.
'96 Id. The option read that their agreement would "automatically be renewed
for consecutive one-year periods, unless either party gives notice to the other that
said party does not intend to renew and extend this agreement." Id.
197 Id.
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him to miss over a month of work. 198 After the treatments, his
doctor declared that he was in remission. 199 The doctor warned,
however, that there was no guarantee that the cancer would not
return.2 00 Boyle had to continue to attend six monthly three to
five day chemotherapy sessions.2 °1 Upon his return to work with
this information, the Chief Executive Officer demoted Boyle to
Vice President of Sales and Boyle refused to return to work. 2
He then filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, pursuing
his claim in district court, which granted summary judgment in
favor of Gallagher.2 3
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that MDS is a
physical impairment, however, the court conceded that it must
evaluate the condition in its treated state because of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Sutton.2' The appellate court concluded that
the MDS did not substantially limit Boyle's major life activity of
working because his cancer was in remission.2 5 Therefore, his
life activities were largely unaffected by MDS, even though he had
to attend six months of chemotherapy treatments. 206 The court
found his required chemotherapy sessions irrelevant because he
could follow his treatment schedule and still maintain a full
workload.20 7 Consequently, the court treated cancer as a correct-
able disability not warranting ADA protection.0 8
The Fifth Circuit's treatment of cancer is in conflict with
Bragdon v. Abbot.2°9 In Bragdon, the Supreme Court found that
an individual infected with HIV, but who is asymptomatic, is
198 Id. Boyle began chemotherapy treatments on December 15, 1993 and
returned to work on January 26, 1994. Id. at 648-49.
199 Id.
200 Id at 649.
201 Id.
202 id.
203 id.
204 Id. at 653. See also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133
(1999).
205 Gallagher, 181 F.3d at 655.
206 Id. at 649.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 655.
209 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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substantially limited in the major life activity of reproduction, and
thus is considered disabled under the ADA.210 Likewise, many
people inflicted with cancer become infertile as a result of the
disease or due to its treatment. 211 Additionally, cancer, like HIV,
a debilitating disease that can be maintained by drug therapy, has
no known cure, and also can result in death.212 As opposed to the
millions of Americans afflicted with cancer, less than 100,000
Americans were reported to the United States Department of Health
and Humans Services to be living with HIV.213 The Court found
that these HIV-infected Americans should be subject to the
umbrella protection of the ADA. It based its decision in Bragdon
on an individual's limited ability to procreate.214 Using this
criteria, cancer and HIV should be afforded the same protection.
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court found that HIV was such
a debilitating disease due to the effect the disease has on a person's
lymphatic system and the immediate abnormalities of the blood
caused by the infection, the district court and court of appeals in
Gallagher should have applied the same analysis to cancer because
of the similar debilitating and deteriorating effects cancer has on an
individual.215
210 Id. at 655.
211 CHEMOTHERAPY, supra note 169, at 15-27.
212 Joan Stephenson, HIV Researchers Air New Findings, 281 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 883 (1999). Although researchers have been progressive in restoring
battered immune systems, doctors have not been able to restore the immune
system completely. Id. at 883.
213 By the end of 1998, the number of Americans that were reported to be
HIV positive was 97,950. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 10
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 7 (1998). This figure differs from the number
of Americans who were reported to be living with AIDS. The number of
Americans who were reported to be living with AIDS was 265,879. Id. Both the
HIV and AIDS rates include only people who are still alive and those who were
reported to confidential testing sites. Id. at 7 nn. 1-3. AIDS is the symptomatic
portion of the illness where AIDS patients T4 lymphocytes have seriously
depleted and patients suffer from a one or more of the opportunistic infections
including: candidiasis; Kaposi's sarcoma; non-Hodgkins lymphoma; and
tuberculosis. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 39-40 (26th ed. 1995).
214 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
215 Id.
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Moreover, an individual treated for cancer may suffer from
many side effects that substantially limit the individual in many life
activities, causing a debilitating effect on the individual. Both the
district court and the court of appeals failed to recognize Boyle as
substantially limited in a major life activity because they regarded
chemotherapy as a mitigating measure, which they believed
expressly foreclosed any analysis of the cancer as substantially
limiting.21 6 In comparison, an individual infected with asymptom-
atic HIV automatically will be considered substantially limited in
a major life activity because of risks involved in reproduction.2 7
People infected with HIV, however, now are able to procreate with
the use of medicinal treatments with little risk to the fetus.
218
Moreover, a person who is asymptomatic can live a normal
lifestyle and may not even suffer in any physical manner from the
infection for many years.219 It seems, then, that the courts have
ignored the substantial limitation that cancer can place on an
individual in major life activities, while recognizing that asymptom-
atic HIV substantially limits an infected individual in a debilitating
manner. Thus, the courts have found HIV to be covered by the
ADA because of its infectious nature as well as because of the
harsh stigma HIV carries in society.22° While the courts should
be praised for their heightened protection of HIV, they also should
be scorned for their insensitive and highly dogmatic view of
cancer, from which many people suffer physical pain as well as
discrimination in the workplace.
216 EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999).
217 HIV can be transmitted during sexual intercourse. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 39 (26th ed. 1995).
218 Lynne Mofenson, Can Perinatal HIV Infection Be Eliminated in the
United States?, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 577 (1999). Due to the use of drug
therapies, such as zidovudine, in early stages of HIV positive pregnant women,
perinatal transmission has been reduced by two thirds. Id. at 577.
219 See generally Harvey Makadon, An Asymptomatic 41 Year Old Man with
HIV Infection, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 739 (1999) (discussing a clinical study
of an HIV patient who has been asymptomatic for nine years).
220 Chai Feldblum, Disability Discrimination in America, 281 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 745 (1999).
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B. Epilepsy and Medication
Epilepsy 22' is a condition that affects one percent of the
United States population.222 Epilepsy, like cancer, may lie dor-
mant within an individual without any apparent sign or symptoms
until it suddenly reappears. 223 Epilepsy is a condition that affects
the nervous system, which governs how electrical energy behaves
in the brain, making the epileptic susceptible to recurring sei-
zures. 2 ' Although seizures are symptoms of epilepsy,2 5 they
may be treated with the use of surgery 226 or oral anti-epileptic
medications.227 Once an individual has suffered from seizures and
is diagnosed with epilepsy, the individual is considered to have a
chronic, lifelong disorder.228 Although, over time, medications
may be reduced, seizures may occur even when the individual
221 See supra note 161 (discussing epilepsy and its effects).
222 Hospitalization for Epilepsy, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1670 (1995).
223 Id.
224 See Patlack, supra note 221, at 29. There are more than 20 different types
of epileptic seizures ranging from a loss of consciousness to bodily convulsions
lasting several minutes. Patlack, supra note 221, at 29.
225 See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 584 (26th ed. 1995).
226 Surgery is a treatment utilized by patients for whom anti-epileptic
medications fail to control their seizures. William J. Marks, Management of
Seizures and Epilepsy, 57 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1589 (1999). Surgery attempts
to completely control the seizure, however, patients may still need to administer
oral anti-epileptic medication. Id. The most common procedure undergone by
epileptics is a temporal lobe resection. Id. Although permanent damage is rare,
patients may suffer from verbal skill deficiencies after surgery. Id.
227 Anti-epileptic drugs prevent or arrest seizures. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 101-02 (26th ed. 1995). Anti-epileptic drugs, which are taken orally,
increase the amount of neurotransmitters in the brain which inhibit the transfer
of electrical impulses from neuron to neuron. Patlack, supra note 221, at 30.
228 Josemir Sander, Towards a Coherent Public-Health Analysis for Epilepsy,
353 LANCET 1817 (1999) (stating that epilepsy is a chronic disorder of unknown
cause and is difficult to prevent). Childhood epilepsy must be distinguished from
the epilepsy that affects adults. Childhood epilepsy differs in both treatment and
prognosis. Shlomo Shinnar, Epilepsy Treatment in the 21' Century, EXCEPTIONAL
PARENT, Oct. 1999, at 64 (stating that choice of anti-epileptic drug treatment is
based on several factors, including seizure type, gender and age). A majority of
children with seizures outgrow their disorder. Id. at 34.
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properly is following the regimented treatment schedule.22 9 An
individual suffering from epilepsy can have a seizure even when
the disorder is well controlled with medication if the regular sleep
cycle is disturbed,23 ° or if a flickering light is present. 23 ' An
epileptic's condition never can be considered cured because
extraneous factors can cause the condition to recur.232 Thus,
epilepsy is never corrected but merely maintained or suppressed.
Although most individuals with epilepsy generally function
normally during a seizure they have little or no control over their
movements or cognitive processes.233 Moreover, although an
individual can take daily medication, this medication only minimiz-
es the occurrence of seizures; it does not prevent them.2 4
When evaluating an epileptic in a medicated state, she does not
appear to be "substantially limited" because epilepsy will not
interfere with the essential functions of most occupations.235 An
epileptic, however, is still subject to suffering an epileptic at-
tack.236 Thus, while an epileptic may suffer a seemingly substan-
tially limiting disability in the form of a seizure under Sutton, the
229 See Marks, supra note 226, at 1589. "Management of patients with
epilepsy is often challenging, as evidenced by a recent report that over one half
of all patients with epilepsy continue to experience at least occasional seizures
despite treatment with anti-epileptic medications." Marks, supra note 226, at
1589.
230 Patlack, supra note 221, at 29 (stating that seizures can be brought on by
a lack of sleep).
231 Patlack, supra note 221, at 29 (stating that seizures can be induced by a
flickering light). See also Thurber v. Browner, No. 93 C 2061, 1994 WL 395007,
at *4 (N.D. I11. July 26, 1994) (finding that the plaintiff was "handicapped"
within the meaning of the Act and that she was a qualified employee whom the
employer had to reasonably accommodate after a flickering light affected her
epileptic condition).
232 Current drugs only suppress epileptic seizures but do not affect the
underlying disorder. Shinna, supra note 228, at 34.
233 ABA COMM. ON MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, MENTAL
DIsABILIrs AND THE AMERICANS wrrIH DISABILITIES AcT 155 (1997).
234 id.
235 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1999). The term "essential functions" means "the
fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a
disability holds or desires." Id.
236 Patlack, supra note 221, at 29.
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Supreme Court would fail to acknowledge this hypothetical, yet
foreseeable, occurrence as a disability.237 Consequently, if an
employer requires a job applicant to state whether she suffers from
a disability, and an applicant lists epilepsy, the fact that the
applicant takes the prescribed medication will prevent a court
finding that the employer violated the ADA if the employer refuses
to hire the individual because of the applicant's disability.238
C. Diabetes and Insulin Medication
Similar to epilepsy, diabetes can result in complications even
while the patient is maintaining the condition with medications and
healthy living habits. 239 Diabetes is a chronic condition, affecting
fourteen million Americans, which manifests itself when the
pancreas is unable to produce sufficient amounts of insulin24
necessary to carry blood sugar into the body's cells. 24 The result
237 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999) (stating
that evaluating [p]ersons "in their hypothetical uncorrected state ... is an
impermissible interpretation of the ADA").
238 Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 89 (demonstrating that if a person has a
medical condition that uses medication, such as epilepsy, there is no disability
and the employer can refuse to hire the individual solely because of epilepsy
without any legal repercussions).
239 See NATIONAL INST. OF DIABETES AND DIGESTIVE AND KIDNEY
DISEASES, DIABETES IN AMERICA 4-9 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter DIABETES]. There
are two types of diabetes mellitus: Type I diabetes, also known as insulin
dependent diabetes and Type H diabetes, also known as non-insulin based
diabetes, usually develops in obese adults over the age of 35. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 473 (26th ed. 1995). The American Diabetes Association
recommends the control of diabetes with education, diet, medication and physical
activity. Id. The Association also recognizes that there are no universal guidelines
to be disseminated concerning the treatment of diabetes. Instead, the treatment
should be tailored to each individual. Id. Diabetes mellitus is a condition in
which carbohydrate utilization is reduced while utilization of lipid and protein
production is increased. Id. Diabetes is caused by a deficiency of insulin. Id.
24o Insulin is a polypeptide hormone that promotes glucose utilization, protein
synthesis, and the formation and storage of neutral lipids. It is administered
intramuscularly or intravenously in the treatment of diabetes mellitus. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 878 (26th ed. 1995).
241 Id.
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is an overflow of blood sugar in the blood, which is passed out
through the body's urinary system.242 Emergency conditions
called hypoglycemia243 or hyperglycemia 24 result from the
imbalance of blood sugar. Diabetes is so serious that it can cause
long term damage to a number of organs including the eyes,
kidneys, nerves, heart, and blood vessels.245
Diabetes complications can develop even while the individual
is maintaining the disorder.24 6 As the Supreme Court requires the
evaluation of a disorder in its present medicated state, a diabetic
using insulin will not be considered disabled for the purposes of
the ADA.247 Moreover, the Court used insulin dependent diabet-
ics as illustrative of a case in which a mitigating measure precludes
an individual from being considered substantially limited. The
Court provided, in dicta, that a diabetic whose insulin injections
allow her to continue working was not covered by the statute
because the diabetic was not "substantially limited" in a major life
activity.248 This reasoning will discourage and prevent an individ-
ual with diabetes from seeking the protection of the ADA.249
242 Id.
23 Id. Hypoglycemia is defined an abnormally low level of sugar in the
circulating blood. Id. at 836. This complication can result in a functional
limitation on individuals with diabetes. Id. After being inflicted with low sugar
levels, an individual may have slow reaction time and be unable to work until
blood sugar levels are raised. DIABETES, supra note 239, at 261.
244 Hyperglycemia is an abnormally high concentration of glucose in the
circulating blood, seen especially in patients with diabetes mellitus. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 825 (26th ed. 1995).
245 Report of the Expert Committee on the Diagnosis and Classification of
Diabetes Mellitus, 23 DIABETES CARE S4 (Jan. 2000).
24m There are several complications that arise as a result of diabetes. Some
of these complications arise even with proper treatment and self care. DIABETES,
supra note 239, at 88, 289, 429, 449. Such complications include: lactic acidosis,
hypoglycemia, vision impairments, heart disease, and stroke. DIABETES, supra
note 239, at 88, 289, 429, 449.
247 Savage, supra note 43, at 46 ("A diabetic whose insulin injections allow
her to continue working is not covered by the statute.").
248 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999).
249 Shereen Arent, Supreme Court Decisions Make it More Difficult for
People with Diabetes to Fight Discrimination, DIABETES FORECAST, Sept. 1999,
at 33, 34.
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Prior to Sutton, diabetics were able to bring successful claims under
the ADA. For example, in Canon v. Clark, the Southern District of
Florida found a diabetic to be "substantially limited" in a number
of major life activities, because she was dependent on her insulin
injections.25 ° It seems, however, that this decision may no longer
carry weight in light of the Sutton dicta.
Most critics argue that the Sutton decision is absurd because a
person may be disabled enough to be fired from a job but not
disabled enough to challenge the firing. 251 Now, under the
Court's analysis, people with diabetes can be fired or refused a
position because they have the disease. Since individuals can use
insulin injections to mitigate their disorders, the lower courts will
exclude completely diabetes from recovery under the Act.
D. Major Depressive Disorder
Major depression, a type of depressive disorder, is a form of
mental illness recognized by the American Psychiatric Associa-
22tion. Approximately six percent of adults in the United States
suffer from major depression in their life time.253 Depressive
2 See, e.g., Canon v. Clark, 883 F. Supp. 718, 721 (S.D. Fl. 1995) (finding
that a diabetic was substantially limited in a number of major life activities
because she was dependent on her insulin injections).
" Arent, supra note 249, at 34.
252 The American Psychiatric Association defines major depressive disorder
as a mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental
Disorders ("DSM-IV"). AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N., DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 339 (4th ed. 1994). The onset
of major depressive disorder can occur at any age. Id. at 341. The following are
the specifiers psychiatrists use to describe the major depressive disorder episode:
mild; moderate; severe without psychotic features; severe with psychotic features;
in partial remission; and in full remission. Id. at 339. Approximately 50% of
individuals who have been diagnosed with this disorder can be expected to have
a second episode. Id. at 34. Individuals who have had two episodes have a 70%
chance of having a third, and individuals who have had three episodes have a
90% chance of having a fourth episode. Thus, this is a recurring disorder. Id. at
342. See also DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN ET AL., THE ADA AND PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS, A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 64 (1993).
253 Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 9.
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disorders usually involve changes in mood.254 Major depression
is characterized as an extreme or prolonged episode of sadness, in
which an individual is no longer interested in activities that the
individual previously enjoyed. 5 This psychiatric disorder does
not subside on its own and requires treatment by medication.5 6
If there is no treatment, the depression can last for long periods of
time. 7 Individuals suffer from major depression throughout their
lives.258 Some of the symptoms of major depression include: an
inability to concentrate, recollect and make decisions; pessimism;
sentiments of worthlessness; loss of pleasure in usual activities;
problems with sleep cycle; social withdrawal; and irritability. 259
These sentiments must be distinguished from occasional sadness or
bad moods. The length of time these symptoms last, and the
severity of the symptoms, is what distinguishes major depression
from general mood changes. Major depression can be treated with
medication, psychotherapy, or a combination of both.26°
Although the ADA does not protect people merely because they
have been diagnosed with major depression, if the individual can
demonstrate how depression affects a major life activity, the
individual should be able to secure protection under the Act.261
It seems, however, that individuals who are diagnosed with major
depressive disorder and claim that they have been discriminated
254 Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 9.
255 Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 64.
256 Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 64.
257 Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 64. Major depression is a severe mental
illness because it affects a person's health, relationships and occupation.
Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 64. Moreover, some symptoms can be so severe
that individuals, who are not treated with this disorder, may commit suicide.
Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 64. Suicide is more prevalent among people who
are diagnosable as suffering from major depression at fifteen percent than the
general population at one percent. Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 64.
258 Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 64.
259 John W. Parry, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 4 (1995).
260 Zuckerman, supra note 252, at 68-69.
261 Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 440 (1995)
(finding that the plaintiff, who suffered from major depressive disorder, was a
person with a disability and is a qualified person with a disability to practice
law).
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against by their employer, have not been successful in the post-
Sutton era.2 6
2
In a recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Spades v. City
of Walnut Ridge,263 the petitioner, Sam Spades, appealed the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
employer.2' The petitioner was employed as a police officer with
the City of Walnut Ridge. 265 During his tenure, he attempted
suicide by shooting himself in the head.266 After this incident,
Spades sought medical attention for his physical injuries as well as
counseling for his depression. 67 Spades attempted to return to
work after his counseling and recuperation period.268 The City,
however, terminated his employment because of his violent use of
a firearm in his suicide attempt.269 Spades alleged that the City
violated the ADA, firing him due to his disability.270 The City
defended their decision reasoning that they sought to prevent
increased exposure to legal liability.271
The Eighth Circuit did not perform an individualized analysis
of the petitioner's condition. Instead, the court merely cited
Sutton,272 and found that because Spades received counseling and
medication for his condition, his depression was thereby correct-
ed.273 Therefore, the court concluded that Spades was not "sub-
262 See, e.g., Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, No. 98-4119, 1999 WL
560627, at *1 (8th Cir. July 28, 1999) (finding that a police officer's major
depressive disorder treated by medication is not a substantially limiting disability
under the ADA); Whitney v. Apfel, No. C-98-1119 PJH, 1999 WL 786369, *1
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1999) (finding that a government employee's major
depressive disorder treated with medication is not a substantially limiting
disability under the ADA).
263 Spades, 1999 WL 560627, at *1.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
273 Spades, 1999 WL 560627, at *2.
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stantially limited" in a major life activity274 and was not entitled
to ADA protection. 75 To reach this conclusion, the court merely
sought out the presence of medication or other mitigating mea-
sures.276 Once it found mitigating measures, the court assumed
that the petitioner was not substantially limited in working and
found the petitioner not to be disabled under the ADA.277 Conse-
quently, the petitioner suffered from employment discrimination
because of his disability. Because the Supreme Court failed to
provide clearer guidance in evaluating a disability, the Eighth
Circuit was unable to provide an individualized analysis of Spades'
disorder as would have been appropriate for disability determina-
tions under the statute. Instead, the court applied the mitigating
measures analysis as a blanket exclusion.
Whitney v. Apfel,278 is another illustration of a court's inabili-
ty to redress emotional illness discrimination in the workplace. The
petitioner brought a cause of action against his employer, the Social
Security Administration ("SSA"). 279 He alleged that the SSA
demoted him because of his disability, depression.28 ° His physi-
cian stated that his depression was caused by his work-related
stress, and upon recommendation by his physician, he took a ten-
week leave of absence. 281 During this period he was treated for
his depression with medication.282 When Whitney returned to
work he was demoted.2 3 Six years later, Whitney applied for a
promotion, and while ranked among the best qualified for the
position, he was not selected for the promotion.28
274 Id. at * 1.
275 Id. (holding that "a determination of whether Spades' depression is a
disability must be made with reference to any mitigating measures") (citing
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47).
276 Id.
277 Id. at *2.
278 Whitney v. Apfel, No. C-98-1119 PJH, 1999 WL 786369, *1 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 1999).
279 Id. at *1.
280 Id. The petitioner became depressed in 1989. Id.
281 id.
282 Id.
283 id.
284 id.
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The court found that Whitney did not qualify for ADA
protection because he no longer suffered from a psychological
impairment. 285 The court held that his medication alleviated his
depression so that he was no longer substantially limited.286 The
court also decided that even if Whitney established that the SSA
believed his depression substantially limited him in the major life
activity of working, he must prove that he was limited in a broad
class of jobs.287 Since there was no proof that he was limited in
a broad class of jobs, the court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants.288 Thus, the court found his depression not to
be protected by the ADA because he utilized drugs to overcome his
disability. 289
Application of the Court's analysis to "hidden disabilities," such
as cancer, epilepsy, diabetes or major depression, has not produced
the results the Supreme Court suggested it desired.290 Although
the Court indicated that it intended "to restrict the ADA only to
those that it believed were members of the historically disadvan-
taged class of disabled people and refused to extend it to people
that are not victims of discrimination or who are not considered to
be politically powerless, '2 9' its actual effect will be to deny
protection to individuals who deserve ADA coverage. Because the
Supreme Court dealt with an easy case of corrective lenses, the
Court was unable to consider the many issues faced by people
suffering from complex disorders, like epilepsy, cancer and
diabetes. Because the more complicated issues faced by individuals
285 Id. at *3.
286 id.
287 id.
28 Id. at *4 ("Because the court finds that Whitney failed to demonstrate
that there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the selection
panel regarded him as disabled, defendant's motion for summary judgment is
granted.").
289 Id. at *3.
290 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2152 (1999) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring). "Congress' use of the phrase ["individuals with disabilities are
a discrete and insular minority"] ... is a telling indication of its intent to restrict
the ADA's coverage to a confined, and historically disadvantaged, class." Id.
291 AMERICANS wrr DISABnrrims ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 101-116, at
9 (1989).
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living with maintainable disabilities was not addressed by the
Court, the lower courts do not have any guidance when applying
the bright-line test. Consequently, once the courts identify a
mitigating measure in use, the judges instead apply the Court's
bright-line test of "substantial limitation in regard to mitigating
measures" as a blanket exclusion.
By failing to recognize the implications of the mitigating
measures analysis, the lower courts will continue to apply this
bright-line test without an individualized analysis as illustrated in
Spades, Gallagher and Whitney. Thus far, the lower courts have not
undertaken an analysis to identify how the person is substantially
limited but, instead, superficially have addressed the subject.292
Once the courts have found a mitigating measure in use, they
automatically have excluded the petitioner from protection. This
burden of proof, to demonstrate a substantial limitation while
receiving treatment, is difficult to overcome. The burden will rarely
be met by an individual utilizing mitigating measures because the
individual will not have any symptoms until an unanticipated attack
occurs. As a result of this "blanket exclusion," plaintiffs are forced
to seek redress under the third prong of the definition of disability
by attempting to prove that their employers regarded them as
disabled, a truly difficult task.
IV. A CLEARER FRAMEWORK
The aforementioned lower court rulings illustrate that the
Supreme Court's holding in Sutton, requiring the consideration of
mitigating factors, did not provide sufficient and clear guidance to
employers and lower courts to address employment discrimination
oppressing the disabled. Moreover, the Supreme Court's holding,
as applied, has and will continue to result in a "blanket exclusion"
of some disabilities from ADA protection, undermining the purpose
and intent of the ADA, which requires an analysis of the individu-
al's condition. Following Sutton and its progeny, in order for
292 See, e.g., Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, No. 98-4110, WL 560627, at
*1 (8th Cir. July 28, 1999); EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.
Tex. 1997), vacated in part, 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999); Whitney v. Apfel, No.
C-98-1119 PJH, 1999 WL 786369, *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1999).
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plaintiffs to vindicate discrimination under the ADA, they must
show that their condition, even after correction, interferes with a
major life activity but will not interfere with their job perfor-
mance."9 This leaves the courts with little room to balance the
interests involved in the disability inquiry.
Instead of evaluating whether an individual is "substantially
limited" at the time of the lawsuit, the courts should adopt an
analysis that focuses on how the individual is affected by the
disability and the treatment. This approach will reward deserving
plaintiffs yet not be overbroad in application. Those who deserve
the protection of the statute will receive it while those who bring
frivolous law suits will be denied access to the courts because they
will be unable to demonstrate the latent and long term impact of
their disorder. If there is no long term impact resulting from the
disorder, the individual cannot be viewed as substantially limited.
If the individual is not substantially limited, the employer need not
hire the individual. Thus, by balancing the interests of both the
employee and employer, courts may apply the ADA fairly and
reasonably.
The proposed framework that follows, incorporates in its
analysis the questions the drafters of the ADA sought to answer, as
well as the relevant statutory and regulatory concerns. 294 The
analysis consists of four parts. First, the court should evaluate
whether there is a possibility that an individual with an impairment
will suffer from symptoms or suffer an attack even while receiving
treatment. 95 Second, the courts should determine whether there
is a permanent or long term impact of the impairment. 296 Third,
the courts should consider whether the qualification the individual
293 Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 90.
294 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12111 (1999) (noting the legislative intent
of the ADA); 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1999) (providing for regulations to implement
the ADA in accordance with the legislative intent).
295 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2)(i) (1999) (calling for the evaluation of "the
nature and severity of the impairment" when considering the factors that
determine "substantially limited" in a major life activity).
296 Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii) (1999) (defining the term "substantially limits"
through an evaluation of the "permanent long term impact... resulting from the
impairment").
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cannot meet is essential to the job sought.2 97 Finally, the courts
should consider whether the public interest is concerned. 298 The
public interest concern is relevant to this balancing test where the
job at issue, such as that of the global airline pilot, places the
employee in a responsible position in relation to other people. The
regulations require that a determination be made whether the
individual causes a "direct threat" to others; that is, whether the
individual creates a significant risk of substantial harm to the health
or safety of others or to himself, that cannot be reduced by
reasonable accommodation.299
The factors in the balancing formula are mutually dependent.
Thus, if the answer to the first factor is in the negative, then the
disability is not latent. If there is no possibility that the person will
be affected by the disability, then the analysis is complete because
the individual cannot be considered substantially limited within the
meaning of "disability" under the ADA. Using this four part
analysis, a court better would be able to balance the goals that the
ADA sought to achieve with the employers' needs that the
Supreme Court sought to protect.3" By balancing the relevant
297 Id. § 1630.2(n)(1)-(2) (defining "essential functions").
298 Id. § 1630.2(r). The public interest is concerned if there is a "direct
threat" to its well being. Id.
Direct threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health
or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or
reduced by reasonable accommodation. The determination that an
individual poses a 'direct threat' shall be based on an individualized
assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the
essential functions of the job. In determining whether an individual
would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include: 1) the
duration of the risk; 2) the nature and severity of the potential harm;
3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and 4) the
imminence of the potential harm.
Id.
299 Id.
'00 Employers' needs include reduced litigation and prevention of fraudulent
and frivolous disability claims. See Sinclair, supra note 9, at 3 ("this decision is
a form of insurance discrimination")."Corporate managers argue that [Murphy]
slows down the growing deluge of ADA lawsuits." Clemetson, supra note 157,
at 27.
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interests, the courts may protect employers, and remain faithful to
the ADA's goals.
A. Application of the Balancing Approach to the Recent
Supreme Court Disability Cases
The following section applies the balancing approach to the
recent Supreme Court disability cases. By balancing the interests
the Court espoused, more individuals will be covered than excluded
by the Court's bright-line test. This test also avoids plaintiffs
having to find redress pursuant to Subsection C of the ADA, °1
which requires employees to demonstrate that their employers
perceived them as disabled, a feat difficult to achieve.
1. Sutton v. United Air Lines30 2
In Sutton, the petitioners stated that they had a vision impair-
ment that was corrected with lenses to an acuity of 20/20.303
Applying the proposed balancing formula, the Court first would
look to see whether the petitioners would suffer from symptoms of
the impairment even while utilizing the corrective measures.
Because the individuals have a vision impairment, there are no
extraneous factors that can change the status of the corrected state.
For instance, the only way the petitioners would suffer from the
effects of this impairment would be if they were to misplace their
glasses. This would not be an effect of the disability, but only a
result of their carelessness. Thus, the question becomes whether the
individual, while taking the medication or utilizing the mitigating
measures, could still suffer from the disability because of extrane-
ous factors. There are, arguably, no extraneous factors that affect
corrected vision. Because the first factor is in the negative, there is
no latent, unidentified symptom that will affect the individual.
Thus, the individual cannot be considered disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.
301 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
302 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
'03 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999).
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The purpose of the ADA was to ensure equal opportunity of
employment for disabled people.3" The petitioners in Sutton
could have found equal opportunity of employment in many other
areas where perfect eyesight was not essential to the job.30 5
Moreover, after balancing the employer's need to have qualified
pilots fly its planes to ensure passenger safety with society's
interest in not discriminating against disabled individuals, the
public interest in flight control is so great that it outweighs the
interest of equal opportunity of employment for those with
impaired vision.
2. Albertsons v. Kirkingburg
3 6
In Albertsons, the petitioner was afflicted with a disorder that
left him with monocular vision. 30 7 Because he lived with this
disorder for many years, his body subconsciously adjusted for the
lack of depth perception that resulted from this disorder.30 8
Amblyopia occurs when the individual's brain and eye nerve
connections fail to develop normally.3" In the case of amblyopia,
the brain learns to ignore visual information from the affected
eye. 310 As a result of the disorder, the patient lacks depth percep-
tion.311 If this condition is diagnosed during childhood, permanent
visual impairment can be avoided. 2 Kirkingburg, however, never
corrected this problem and his brain subconsciously adjusted for
304 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994) (indicating that the Nation's proper goals
regarding individuals with disabilities are to "assure equality of opportunity").
305 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. "Indeed, there are a number of other positions
utilizing petitioners' skills, such as regional pilot and pilot instructor to name a
few, that are available to them." Id.
306 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
" Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). Kirkingburg suffers from amblyopia
which left him with monocular vision in effect. Id. at 2165. See STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 56 (26th ed. 1995) (discussing amblyopia).
308 Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2168.
309 See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 56 (26th ed. 1995) (defining
amblyopia).
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
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the poor vision .313 This self-mechanism is not a correction of his
eyesight, it is merely an accommodation. Kirkingburg developed
this mechanism to compensate for the depth perception that he
lacked because of his disability. Thus, under the first prong of the
balancing test he must be considered substantially limited because
there is no true correction of the disability. Instead, because a
mechanism of the body has mitigated his vision impairment, he
may continue to suffer.
The second prong of the balancing test evaluates whether the
disorder has a long term impact on the individual. In the case of
amblyopia, if the disorder is not corrected early then the patient
will have permanent vision damage.314 Kirkingburg did not
correct the vision impairment in his early childhood, resulting in
his poor vision as an adult. Thus, Kirkingburg is substantially
limited under the ADA because the deterioration of his vision, as
a result of amblyopia, has a permanent and long term impact on his
major life activity of seeing.
The third prong considers whether the qualification the
employee lacks is essential to the job. In this case, the federal
agency that instituted the minimum vision requirement waived it as
a result of Kirkingburg's excellent driving record.315 The agency
that instituted the regulation found that it was not essential for
Kirkingburg's position. 16 Thus, the minimum vision requirement
cannot be considered an essential function of the job. As a result,
Kirkingburg cannot be excluded from the position because he is
unable to fulfill the vision requirement.
If the Court were to continue the analysis, by considering the
final prong, the public interest at stake is not so great as to
outweigh Kirkingburg's right to employment. During his employ-
ment and while he was inflicted with this impairment, Kirkingburg
313 Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2168.
314 See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 56 (26th ed. 1995) (defining
amblyopia).
315 Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2166 (citing the waiver of the minimum vision
requirement).
316 Id. One can infer that the minimum vision requirement was not essential
to the job because the agency that instituted the requirements waived them.
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was never involved in any moving violations or traffic offens-
es.317 His excellent driving record was a strong indication that he
was not a hazard on the road or a threat to the public's safety, even
though he was unable to see like the general population.31
Because the threat to the public was not overwhelming, society's
interest in protecting Kirkingburg from employment discrimination
outweighed his employer's interests. Thus, Kirkingburg should have
received ADA protection.
3. EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co. 3
19
The first prong of the balancing approach requires a determina-
tion that there is a possibility that the individual will suffer from
the disorder even while receiving treatment. In the case of Boyles'
cancer, he suffered from the effects of the treatments for the
disorder and lacked a guaranteed cure for his cancer.320 For
example, although Boyle's doctor stated that he was in remission
after the treatments, Boyle died merely one year after he returned
to work, evidence that his condition was not corrected.321 More-
over, it is uncontroverted that cancer patients suffer from the
effects of treatment.322 Boyle suffered from the chemotherapy
treatments both cosmetically and physically.323 Thus, Boyle's
condition satisfies the first prong of the analysis because his
condition was never fully corrected.
The second prong evaluates whether the disorder had a long
term impact on the individual. In this case, the long term impact on
317 Id. at 2166.
318 Id. at 2167. There is uncontroverted evidence that "the manner in which
he sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see." Id.
"' EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997), vacated
in part, 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999).
320 Gallagher, 181 F.3d at 648. "Boyle was released from the hospital...
having lost all the hair on his head, his eyelashes and eyebrows, and twenty-five
pounds." Id.
321 Id. at 650 n.1.
322 See CHEMOTHERAPY, supra note 169, at 15-27. See also RADIATION
THERAPY, supra note 174, at 27.
323 Gallagher, 181 F.3d at 648.
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Boyle was that the cancer was terminal. As the condition was long
term, the second prong of the balancing approach is satisfied.
The third prong evaluates whether the qualification that the
individual allegedly could not meet was essential to the job. The
employer, Gallagher, argued that Boyle was unable to "devote his
full time and best efforts towards furthering the interest of the
employer" because he was forced to take days off of work for his
cancer treatments.324 The fact that Boyle needed to take off days
to attend to and recover from his cancer treatments does not
indicate that he could not fulfill the essential function of his
position as president of the company. Boyle demonstrated that he
was able to fulfill his position by delegating work assignments
during his absences.3 25 Thus, he appeared able to meet the
essential functions of the position of president.
Finally, there was no public interest at stake to consider against
Boyle's employment as a disabled person. Boyle was president of
the company and was not a hazard to anyone at the company.
Thus, if the court would have employed this balancing analysis, it
would have found Boyle disabled under the ADA.
B. The Light at the End of the Tunnel: Other Avenues of
Redress under the ADA
The ADA allows plaintiffs to seek protection from discrimina-
tion under any of the three prongs of the Act's definition of
disability.3 26 Many litigants attempt to prove discrimination under
the third prong of the definition.3 27 The third prong of the defini-
tion defines disability as "being regarded as having such an impair-
ment" by an employer.3
28
In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,32 9 although the
petitioner was unable to prove that he was substantially limited in
324 Id. at 651.
325 Id. at 648.
326 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A-C) (1994).
327 Id. § 12102(2)(C).
328 Id.
329 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999). "Petitioner was diagnosed with hypertension
when he was 10 years old." Id. at 2136.
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the major life activity of working under Subsection A of the Act,
he also claimed that he was perceived as disabled by UPS under
Subsection C.330 The Court, however, refused to recognize this
claim, as well. The Court disagreed that Murphy was perceived as
disabled, even though his employer told him he was "fired because
of his hypertension. 33'
In the aftermath of the Murphy decision, it seems that litigation
will not be reduced, as the Supreme Court would have liked, but
instead, will increase under the third prong of the definition of
disability. Although the Supreme Court treated harshly the question
of whether Murphy was regarded by his employer as disabled, the
lower courts have been sympathetic to the claims of plaintiffs.
332
A recent litany of cases demonstrate that many courts will preclude
summary judgment motions to dismiss the "perceived as disabled"
prong of the definition of disability under the Act.
In the following district and appellate court cases, plaintiffs
were successful in precluding summary judgment motions of their
discrimination claim under the third prong of the ADA's definition
of disability.333 While decisions have not yet been reached as to
"0 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
"3 Petitioner's Opening Brief at * 104a-105a, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) (No. 97-1992). Murphy was impaired by high blood
pressure and treated his condition with prescribed medication. Murphy, 119 S.
Ct. at 2136.
332 While courts have not permitted the claim of substantial limitation to
survive summary judgment, they have permitted ADA cases to survive summary
judgment on the claim that the employers regarded the plaintiffs as disabled. See
EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999); Morris v. Dempsey
Ing Inc., 1999 WL 1045032 (N.D. 11. Nov. 12, 1999); Matlock v. Dallas, 1999
WL 1032601 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999); Cinelli v. U.S. Energy Partners, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 566 (1999).
... 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). See also Gallagher, 181 F.3d 645) (finding that
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff, an individual
suffering from cancer, was regarded as disabled by his employer when the
employer demoted him, after learning of his cancer); Morris v. Dempsey, 1999
WL 1045032 (N.D. 11. Nov. 12, 1999) (finding that there was a genuine issue
of material fact when an employer terminated the plaintiff, a diabetic, by telling
him that "the company considered him a liability because of his diabetic
condition"); Matlock v. Dallas, 1999 WL 1032601 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999)
(denying a summary judgment motion as to the "regarded as" claim because the
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whether these individuals will be considered to be disabled under
this prong, these successful motions demonstrate that the disabled
may be able to carve out a niche where they can continue to
embrace the protection of the ADA.
In EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co.,334 the court of appeals
quickly dismissed the plaintiff's challenge of the lower court's
finding that Boyle was not substantially limited in a major life
activity due to his cancer under Subsection A of the ADA.335 The
court found that under Sutton,336 since Boyle was able to utilize
a mitigating anti-cancer treatment, he could not be considered
substantially limited in a major life activity.337 The court of
appeals, however, was more sympathetic than the lower court when
it evaluated the district court's summary judgment decision, which
found that the employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled due
to his cancer under Subsection C of the Act.338 The court of
appeals found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the employer regarded Boyle as disabled.339 The court
relied on the fact that Boyle was demoted to a position that
provided for half the annual income that he received as presi-
dent.34° The court found that the demotion was enough to pre-
clude a summary judgment motion because a jury could reasonably
plaintiff's employer fired him due to his hearing impairment); Cinelli v. U.S.
Energy Partners, 77 F. Supp. 2d 566 (1999) (finding that there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the plaintiff, an individual suffering from non-
Hodgkins lymphoma, a form of cancer, was perceived by his employer to be
disabled when his employer expressed doubts that he could continue to do his
job adequately due to his health problems).
I3 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999).
331 Id. at 655.
336 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
3 Gallagher, 181 F.3d at 655.
3 EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405, 409 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
The district court stated that the "regarded as" prong of the definition is to
protect people who have some obvious specific handicap that employers might
generalize into a disability, such as wearing an eye patch or missing a limb. Id.
339 Gallagher, 181 F.3d at 657.
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conclude that the offer for a lower position, with a lower salary,
was constructive discharge based on discrimination. 4
In Morris v. Dempsey ING, Inc.,3 2 the plaintiff, Cary Morris,
was a diabetic." Unlike the previous cases discussed, the plain-
tiff did not claim that he was substantially limited in a major life
activity.344 Instead, Morris strictly claimed that his employer
regarded him as disabled pursuant to Subsection C of the Act.34'
The company told him that he was considered a liability because
of his diabetic condition when it discharged him.346 In the court's
short opinion, it found that this was evidence enough to state a
claim for relief." Thus, the court denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment."
In Cinelli v. U.S. Energy Partners,349 the plaintiff, James
Cinelli, also did not file a claim arguing that he was substantially
limited under Subsection A of the Act but instead pursued a claim
under Subsection C, arguing that his employer regarded him as
disabled.350 The plaintiff was diagnosed with non-Hodgkins
lymphoma, an incurable form of cancer.35 ' Three days after
learning of Cinelli's condition, his supervisors fired him.352 The
employer argued that it fired Cinelli because he was unable to meet
34' Id. at 656-57.
342 Morris v. Dempsey ING, Inc., 1999 WL 1045032, at *1 (N.D. I1. Nov.
12, 1999).
343 Id.
' Id. The court pointed out that this would have been a fruitless claim
because the Sutton opinion included language that stated that diabetics using
corrective medication may not be disabled under the ADA. Id.
341 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
3" Morris, 1999 WL 1045032, at *1.
341 Id. at *3.
348 Id.
349 77 F. Supp. 2d 566 (D. N.J. 1999).
350 Id. at 569.
351 Id.
352 Id. Initially, Cinelli told his employer that he found a lump in his neck
and was going to a specialist to have a biopsy. Id. at 570. Shortly after this
discussion, Cinelli learned that the lump was a malignant tumor. Id. Cinelli
informed his employer that the lump was cancerous and that he planned to
undergo surgery to have it removed. Id. at 571. Once the tumor was tested, the
plaintiff's doctor informed him that he had terminal incurable cancer. Id.
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the quota required for the position and because he had not
generated any new sales.353 In response, Cinelli provided evi-
dence that his new accounts were of considerable size and would
be profitable to the company.354 Moreover, the company sent
Cinelli a letter advising him that he was discharged because of his
inability to perform his job functions.355 The court found that a
reasonable inference could be made that Cinelli's employer fired
him because he was disabled based on the employer's use of the
word "inability., 356 Thus, the court denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment.357
It remains to be seen whether the third prong of the ADA will
provide a successful alternative to the substantial limitation claim
for plaintiffs utilizing mitigating measures. If, however, the courts
follow the Murphy interpretation of Subsection C regarding
whether the employer perceived the individual to be "substantially
limited" in a major life activity, the disabled may not have any
other redress under the Act. Thus, their livelihoods may be
threatened due to the failure of the Supreme Court to recognize the
complete ramifications of its decisions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Sutton concerning the
definition of disability has had a serious impact on the judicial
system. The intent of the ADA has been defeated by the sweeping
ruling that considers individuals using "mitigating measures" to be
disabled only upon a showing of substantial limitation. This has
had the effect of denying disabled individuals that have maintained
their disorders, but who have not corrected them, the protection of
the ADA in employment discrimination cases.
Although the Court was concerned with employer discrimina-
tion liability and frivolous lawsuits, its narrow definition of
disability will not reduce the amount of frivolous lawsuits brought
... Id. at 571.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id.
317 Id. at 579.
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before the court. Instead of protecting the disabled, the Court's rule
excludes from protection all plaintiffs utilizing mitigating measures.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's ruling also failed to provide the
lower courts with guidance to conduct a fair and individualized
analysis of disorders that can be maintained with medical treatment.
As a result, the lower courts have applied a "blanket exclusion" to
mitigating measures cases denying worthy petitioners ADA
protection.
To avoid this "blanket exclusion" and the application of blind
justice, the courts should apply the balancing formula proposed in
this Note. Application of the balancing formula to the Supreme
Court's recent disability decisions demonstrates that balancing the
interests of the individual against the employer and society will
protect the employer's interests in avoiding frivolous claims and at
the same time fulfill the ADA's promises to the disabled. Frivolous
claims will be dismissed early if plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the
long term impact of the impairment. Those that are able to
demonstrate the long term impact of the impairment will secure the
rightful protection of the ADA.
Finally, although protection under the ADA has now been
narrowed by the Court, the disabled may be able to take advantage
of the third prong of the statute, allowing them to demonstrate that
their employers regarded them as disabled. This third prong,
however, requires a much higher threshold of proof because the
plaintiff must allege the intent of the employer, which requires
evidence that may be difficult to obtain. In the post-Sutton era, the
lower courts have taken advantage of this "last resort" and have
prevented employers from totally denying the disabled any
protection of the statute. However, this "last resort" still falls short
of the purpose of the ADA's optimistic goal to prevent discrimina-
tion and to successfully employ the disabled.
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